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ABSTRACT 
 
Benjamin Edwards Buck: Automatic And Controlled Components Of Attribution Biases In 
Schizophrenia; Examination Of Novel Measures Of Intentionality And Immorality Bias  
(Under the direction of David L. Penn) 
 
 
Social cognition is a strong predictor of outcome in schizophrenia and it is responsive to 
psychosocial intervention. In schizophrenia research, it has been shown to comprise two 
categories of cognitive variables, skills and biases. Existing measures of one core social 
cognitive bias – hostile attribution bias – do not allow access to assessment of the processes 
underlying such judgments, they conflate multiple constructs, and relationships to criterion 
outcomes are modest. To address these limitations, the present study applied two innovative 
paradigms from social psychology – the intentionality bias (Rosset, 2008) and the immorality 
bias (Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017) – to a sample of individuals with schizophrenia or 
schizoaffective disorder and a comparison group of non-clinical controls. Results suggested that 
individuals with schizophrenia do present with an elevated bias to interpret intentionality in 
others’ ambiguous actions, and this bias appears modestly related to interpersonal conflict, 
paranoia, hostile cognition and behavior, though unrelated to positive symptoms. The immorality 
bias, on the other hand, was not elevated in schizophrenia or paranoia, nor was it related to any 
disorder-related processes. In examining parameters separating controlled and automatic 
processes, the present study raises a number of questions about measurement of biases and dual-
process procedures in schizophrenia.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Social Cognition in Schizophrenia 
 Schizophrenia, a severe mental disorder that affects nearly 1% of the world’s population 
(Saha et al., 2005), is characterized by the positive symptoms of hallucinations, delusions, or 
disorganization, the negative symptoms of affect flattening, anhedonia, avolition or alogia, and 
significant impairment in vocational or social functioning (Bellack et al., 2007; Couture, Penn & 
Roberts, 2006). Early research work on the treatment of schizophrenia aimed at improvements in 
symptom management with psychotropic medications (Eckman et al., 1992; Falloon et al., 
1982). While medications have been effective in managing positive symptoms, they have 
significant side effects (Leucht et al., 1999), and only provide modest improvements in 
functioning (e.g. work attendance and performance, social engagement, etc.) and negative 
symptoms (Sergi et al., 2007; Swartz et al., 2007).  
Thus, recent developments in schizophrenia research have taken two aims: first, identify 
any measurable cognitive abilities that provide reliable predictions of functioning (Fett et al., 
2011; Holthausen et al., 2007) and second, develop and evaluate evidence-based interventions 
that best remediate these domains (Gold, 2004; Kurtz & Richardson, 2012).  The most well-
established predictor of functioning in schizophrenia, neurocognition (Green et al., 2004; 
Twamley, Jeste & Bellack, 2003), has proven useful in generating treatments of the disorder (i.e. 
cognitive remediation; McGurk et al., 2007), but still only predicts a portion of the variance in 
functional outcomes (Velligan et al., 1997). More recently, other promising domains have been 
2 
identified to address this limitation, one of these being specifically social cognition (Penn et al., 
1997). 
Individuals with schizophrenia are consistently impaired in social cognition (Savla et al., 
2013), which is defined in the clinical research on schizophrenia as “the mental operations that 
underlie social interactions, including perceiving, interpreting, and generating responses to the 
intentions, dispositions, and behaviors of others” (Green et al., 2008, p. 1211). Social cognition 
is separable statistically and theoretically from general neurocognition (Allen et al., 2007; van 
Hooren et al., 2008), is itself a robust predictor of concurrent (Couture, Penn & Roberts, 2006; 
Fett et al., 2011) and prospective (Horan et al., 2012) functioning, and is largely responsive to 
psychosocial interventions (Kurtz & Richardson, 2011). As a result of this, research into social 
cognition has been rapidly growing; the number of PsycINFO citations per year using “social 
cognition” and “schizophrenia” as key terms more than quintupled in the five years between 
2002 and 2007 (Green & Leitman, 2008).  
Differentiating social cognitive biases and social cognitive skills 
Social cognition in schizophrenia comprises two categories: (1) abilities to correctly 
interpret social information, or social cognition skills and (2) specific patterns in open-ended 
interpretations of social situations, or social cognitive biases (Mancuso et al., 2011; Roberts & 
Pinkham, 2013). Each social cognition skill comprises a singular ability to arrive at a clear 
correct answer, thus each skill presents an area in which an individual is either impaired or 
skilled. These skills – which include abilities like emotion perception (Kohler et al., 2009), 
theory of mind (Bora, Yucel & Pantelis, 2009), and social perception (Sergi et al., 2006) – 
correlate highly with neurocognition (Fett et al., 2011; Sergi et al., 2007; van Hooren et al., 
2008), independent living skills, social skills, and social functioning (Mancuso et al., 2011). 
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These social cognition skills are either unifactorial (Browne et al., 2016; Buck et al., 2016a), or 
divide across two-factors according to level of the complexity of judgment involved (i.e. low-
level cue detection and higher order processes; Mancuso et al., 2011).  
Differently, social cognition biases do not assess one’s ability to correctly respond in a 
right-or wrong determination, but rather examine the style with which one tends to respond in 
certain social circumstances. In this way, pathological responding is not identified solely through 
so-called “deficits,” but instead, generally extreme response patterns. Five social cognitive biases 
have been identified in the schizophrenia literature: (1) the bias to attribute negative events to the 
external world and positive events to oneself, or externalizing bias (EB; Bentall, Kinderman & 
Kaney, 1994), (2) the bias to attribute events caused externally to specific others rather than 
situations or chance or personalizing bias (PB; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996), (3) the bias to 
attribute all events to others rather than oneself, regardless of valence (Moritz et al., 2007), (4) 
the bias to attribute negative events caused by others to intentional hostile motives or the hostile 
attribution bias (HAB; Combs et al., 2007), and (5) aberrant decision making in determining the 
trustworthiness of ambiguous others, or trustworthiness bias (TB; Pinkham et al., 2008).  
Individuals from a general schizophrenia sample tend to regard others’ intentions as 
hostile and intentional in ambiguous negative situations (HAB; Combs et al., 2009; Buck et al., 
2016b; Lahera et al., 2015; Kanie et al., 2014), and use facial cues differently from controls to 
make determinations about trustworthiness (TB; Couture et al., 2010; Hall et al., 2004; McIntosh 
& Park, 2014). Those experiencing active paranoia or persecutory delusions are likely to blame 
others for negative events and oneself for positive events (EB; Bentall & Kaney, 2005; Combs et 
al., 2009; Craig et al., 2004; Jolley et al., 2006; Mehl et al., 2010; Randall et al., 2003), attribute 
the cause of fewer events (regardless of valence) to themselves (SCB; Aakre et al., 2009; Diez-
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Alegria et al., 2006; Lincoln et al., 2010; Moritz et al., 2010; Randall et al, 2003; Randjbar et al., 
2011), more strongly and consistently attribute ambiguous negative events to others’ intentional 
hostility (HAB; Chang et al., 2009; Combs et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2014) and also systematically 
regard others as untrustworthy (TB; Buck et al., 2016b, Pinkham et al., 2008; Pinkham, Harvey 
& Penn, 2016). Further, these biases provide information about clinically important phenomena 
in schizophrenia, including persecutory delusions or paranoia (Combs et al., 2007b, 2009; Craig 
et al., 2004; Mehl et al., 2010, 2014; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997b; Langdon et al., 2006; 
Langdon, Ward & Coltheart, 2010; Lincoln et al., 2010), depressive symptoms and self-esteem 
(Candido & Romney, 1990; Fraguas et al., 2008; Krstev, Jackson & Maude, 1999; Mancuso et 
al., 2011; Martin & Penn, 2002; Sanjuan et al., 2009), attachment style (Donohoe et al., 2008), 
state and trait anxiety (le Gall et al., 2013), and clinical insight (Langdon et al., 2006).  
Clinical utility of social cognitive biases 
Overall, social cognitive biases appear to provide useful information that differs from the 
kind of information provided by assessments of social cognitive skills. Social cognitive skills 
provide information primarily about skill-based functional outcomes like independent living or 
social functioning. Social cognitive bias measurement is useful in a clinical context as these 
measures appear to aid in (1) clarifying heterogeneity and identifying subgroups within 
schizophrenia, (2) identifying treatment targets for cognitive interventions, and (3) providing a 
window into the cognitive processes that contribute to the emergence of paranoia or persecutory 
symptoms.  
First, each social cognitive bias appears to identify groups within the heterogeneous 
schizophrenia category. In particular, there is significant variation within a schizophrenia sample 
with regards to what phenomena create the most significant impediments to functioning, and 
5 
how. For example, individuals with primary social cognitive skill impairments may struggle to 
process incoming messages, remember information, and solve problems, but avoid interpersonal 
conflicts (Mancuso et al., 2011; Pinkham et al., 2016b). On the other hand, the individual 
elevated in suspiciousness and hostility may process and remember information effectively, but 
she or he may avoid interpersonal interaction or approach socializing in a manner that results in 
conflict (Buck et al., 2016b; Pinkham, Penn & Harvey, 2016). Social cognitive biases provide 
information underlying domains that might explain or predict the risk of individuals’ 
encountering such outcomes.  
 Second, social cognitive biases provide an area of for clinical intervention, though large 
trials examining the effect of interventions have been rare. A few studies (Brakoulias et al, 2008; 
Tas et al., 2012) have examined the effect of cognitive behavior therapy on externalizing and 
personalizing biases, but these were not specifically targeting individuals with persecutory 
delusions. Skills training interventions (e.g. Social Cognition Interaction Training [SCIT; 
Roberts & Penn, 2009]; Social Cognition Skills Training [SCST; Horan et al., 2009, Horan et al., 
2011] and Metacognitive and Social Cognitive Training [MSCT; Rocha & Queirios, 2013]) have 
taken this approach in challenging participants to adjust their attributions, yet these have had 
mixed support, with small treatment effects in outpatient and community settings (Hasson-
Ohayon et al., 2014; Roberts & Penn, 2009; Roberts et al., 2010; Tas et al., 2012; Kurtz & 
Richardson, 2012 for a review), moderate treatment effects in inpatient settings (Combs et al., 
2007a) and large effects in reducing extreme responding overall (Wang et al., 2013). Overall, 
meta-analytic work shows small to moderate effects of skills training interventions on 
attributional style (Kurtz et al., 2016). While considerable work remains in designing and 
adjusting these interventions, social cognitive biases provide an identifiable target to approach 
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from a psychosocial perspective. Approaching persecutory delusions from a psychosocial 
approach can be particularly challenging for clinicians; persecutory delusions (once well-formed) 
often defy rational counterargument and are maintained despite overwhelming counterevidence 
(Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). Addressing social cognitive biases might lend themselves to 
treatment in a way well-formed persecutory delusions do not. Remediating or practicing 
adjustments to aberrant social cognitive biases might aid clients in preventing or countering 
potentially delusional beliefs. 
 Third, from a broad research perspective, the study of social cognitive biases could 
provide further insight into the processes that underlie psychosis, in particular persecutory 
delusions. Social cognitive biases are strongly related to these phenomena (Combs et al., 2007b, 
2009; Craig et al., 2004; Mehl et al., 2010, 2014; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997b; Langdon et al., 
2006; Langdon et al., 2010; Lincoln et al., 2010). A better understanding of these biases might 
provide groundwork for a cognitive model of persecutory delusions. Findings related to changes 
in these biases provide testable hypotheses about the cognitions associated with persecutory 
delusions. Preliminary research suggests that persecutory delusions might emerge as products of 
dual process interactions of social cognitive biases with stress, time, and context. For example, in 
their defensiveness model of paranoia, Bentall and colleagues (2001) hypothesized that 
individuals with paranoia blame others for negative events to reduce associated threats to self-
esteem. This hypothesis has been supported by findings demonstrating that paranoid individuals 
have low implicit and high explicit self-esteem (Mehl et al., 2010; Moritz Werner & Collani, 
2006), experience sampling models showing a decrease in mood and self-esteem precedes a 
spike in severity of persecutory delusions (Thewissen et al., 2011), and findings demonstrating 
that the (explicit) externalizing bias of individuals with paranoia is more labile than non-patient 
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controls (Bentall & Kaney, 2005). Further, Moritz and colleagues (2011) found that under a 
stress induction, individuals with paranoia showed increases in their tendency to attribute 
responsibility to other people (across event valence), whereas control participants’ responses 
remained the same. While these findings are too preliminary for developed models, they do 
support a view suggesting that paranoia may result from difficulty regulating the downstream 
effects of automatic biases (as in Moritz et al., 2011) or an explicit effort to counteract implicit 
low-self esteem (Lyon et al., 1994). These rich accounts of the emergence of persecutory 
delusions suggest value exists in treatment approaches that attend to managing stress and 
challenging biased cognitions when the individual is under threat. Studies of social cognitive 
biases might allow for that rich process-oriented account of the emergence of persecutory 
delusions. 
Limitations in the study of social cognitive biases 
Recent efforts to better understand cognition and functioning in schizophrenia have 
turned toward large-scale psychometric validation studies. These studies (e.g. MATRICS, Green 
et al., 2004; SCAF, Green, Lee, & Ochsner, 2013; VALERO, Leifker et al., 2009; SCOPE; 
Pinkham et al., 2015, 2016b) aim to gather expert consensus on important domains of cognition 
or functioning, examine available assessment tools from the research literature, create “gold-
standard” batteries to examine the area, and validate those batteries for use. In this process, these 
studies generally recruit large samples of individuals with schizophrenia that are (1) currently 
medicated, (2) in a stable period of illness, and (3) heterogeneous with regard to presentation 
(e.g. primary deficit syndrome, primary paranoia, etc.). Using samples of this kind, cognitive 
assessments are examined (among other attributes) for their ability to (1) distinguish between 
participants with schizophrenia and controls, (2) reliably provide consistent performance for each 
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participant (e.g. inter-rater and test-retest reliability), and (3) consistently predict measures of 
real-world functioning (e.g. independent living skills, role functioning, social functioning) 
(Pinkham et al., 2015, 2016b). 
Such efforts have led to progress in developing theoretical models (Lysaker et al., 2013; 
Mancuso et al., 2011) and empirically supported instruments (Pinkham et al., 2016b) for social 
cognitive skills; however, similar success with regard to social cognitive biases has been elusive. 
A critical development in social cognition research in schizophrenia was the Social Cognition 
Psychometric Evaluation (SCOPE; Pinkham et al., 2015) study, a large-scale multiphase study 
gathering expert opinions on core domains and measures of social cognition in this population, 
establishing consensus through RAND panel methodology (Fitch et al., 2001), and developing, 
piloting, and validating a gold-standard measurement battery assessing these domains (Pinkham 
et al., 2016b). In the first phase of the SCOPE study (Pinkham et al., 2015) one bias-related 
domain was identified as a core domain of social cognition, attributional style/bias, and only one 
measurement was identified as having adequate psychometric support, the Ambiguous Intention 
Hostility Questionnaire (AIHQ; Combs et al, 2007c), a measure of hostile attribution bias. Other 
social cognitive biases did not have sufficient research support, as some biases have not been 
systematically studied in a clinical context (trustworthiness bias and self-causation bias), and 
others are inconsistently present in schizophrenia samples, (externalizing bias and personalizing 
bias; Savla et al., 2013).   
However, at the conclusion of the initial psychometric study, because of modest test-
retest reliability coefficients and poor relationships of the AIHQ to functional outcomes like 
independent living skills and role functioning, this measure was removed from inclusion in the 
final battery. This has raised a contradiction in the literature; attribution bias is regarded as a 
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well-established and important domain of social cognition with ostensible psychometric support 
and clinical utility, however, in-depth psychometric review revealed that this measure had 
limited utility in predicting criterion outcomes, and therefore was excluded from further study 
(Pinkham et al., 2016b). This complexity has directed current research toward an improved and 
more nuanced understanding of attributional style, and in particular, the domain studied in 
SCOPE, the hostile attribution bias.  
Hostile Attribution Bias  
Attributions, or explanations of the cause of events, can have affective, behavioral, or 
cognitive consequences for individuals generating them. People differ with regard to the 
frequency with which they make certain kinds of attributions, particularly for important life 
events. “Attributional style” (AS; or “attributional bias”1, AB) refers to the pattern with which 
individuals generate explanations of the causes of positive, negative or ambiguous events that 
occur in their lives (Peterson et al., 1982). The effects of attributional style on emotion and 
behavior are well-documented in a range of psychiatric disorders, most extensively in mood 
disorders (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Sweeney, Anderson & Bailey, 1986), but also 
in externalizing symptoms in childhood (Crick & Dodge, 1994), anxiety disorders (Heimberg et 
al., 1989), eating disorders (Mansfield & Wade, 2000), and pediatric chronic illnesses 
(Schoenherr et al., 1992).  
Initial work on attributional style in patients with schizophrenia merely examined these 
individuals as a psychiatric control sample compared to those with depression, who 
demonstrated a “depressive attributional style” (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). 
Depressed individuals are more likely to make internal attributions about negative events (i.e., 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""1These terms will be used interchangeably in the current review. 2 This was after a Bonferroni connection to account for the number of correlations computed in the study (p = .05 / 45). 
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rather than to others or circumstances), and to regard these characteristics as stable (i.e., 
unchanging) and global (i.e., relevant across domains of life). People with schizophrenia, on the 
other hand were significantly less likely to attribute negative events to themselves, not only in 
comparison to the depressed subjects, but also to non-clinical controls (externalizing bias). While 
these initial observations raised important questions about the nature of attributions in psychosis, 
later developments demonstrated inconsistent results in samples with schizophrenia and 
persecutory delusions (Savla et al., 2013).  
However, future research noted that even when events are clearly negative and 
attributable to others, individuals still differ in patterns with which they interpret others’ 
intentions. Combs and colleagues (2007c) argued that individuals with schizophrenia might be 
more likely to interpret others’ actions as intentional and hostile, and this tendency may 
contribute to paranoia. This – the hostile attribution bias – describes the tendency to believe 
negative events are the result of intentional, hostile actions, rather than accidents or chance. 
Combs et al. (2007c) presented a model of three related biases in these negative situations: blame 
(the tendency to think others acted intentionally), hostility (the tendency to ascribe hostile 
motives) and aggression (the tendency to describe a hypothetical aggressive behavioral response 
to the event). They hypothesized that because these ambiguous situations are especially difficult 
to interpret for those with social cognition impairments, this ambiguity and challenge would 
result in a tendency to interpret others’ actions in a hostile manner. To examine these biases, they 
presented participants with hypothetical ambiguous scenarios involving the actions of others, and 
asked them to identify the extent to which the actions of others were purposeful, blameworthy, 
and made them angry. This procedure was developed as a brief instrument, the Ambiguous 
Intentions Hostility Questionnaire (AIHQ; Combs et al., 2007c).  
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The Ambiguous Intentions Hostility Questionnaire (AIHQ) 
The rationale of the AIHQ is that as individuals with schizophrenia show social cognition 
impairments, they are less apt to correctly attribute the causes for others’ behavior, and in the 
absence of information, may show a bias toward threat (Combs et al., 2007c). Each item of the 
AIHQ presents individuals with ambiguous scenarios (e.g. “You walk past a bunch of teenagers 
at a mall, and they start to laugh”) and asks three questions with ratings provided on a Likert 
scale: “did [the person(s)] do this to you on purpose?”, “how angry would it make you feel?”, 
and “how much would you blame [the person(s)]?”. The participant also generates an attribution 
for why the event occurred, and how they would hypothetically respond behaviorally. The Likert 
scale questions are summed to calculate a blame score and the open-ended responses are 
evaluated by an independent rater (also on a Likert scale) for how hostile the attribution and how 
aggressive the hypothetical behavioral response. Thus, the hostility bias describes the tendency 
for an individual to interpret an other’s action as ill-wishing or hostile, the aggression bias 
describes the tendency for the individual to respond to ambiguous situations with antisocial or 
aggressive behaviors (e.g. to shout at others), and the blame score is an index measure 
combining judgments of blame and feelings of anger. Each scenario item is varied by its 
ambiguity, and these items are separated into three categories: accidental (other actors seemingly 
acting unintentionally), intentional (other actors seemingly acting intentionally), and ambiguous 
(intentions of actors are unclear).  
In a large sample of non-clinical controls, the AIHQ demonstrated strong inter-rater 
reliability (for hostility and aggression scores) and internal consistency. To validate the measure, 
Combs and colleagues (2007c) used hierarchical linear regression to examine whether the AIHQ 
predicted paranoia beyond other extant predictors of paranoia. They found that indeed the AIHQ 
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(combined Aggression, Hostility and Blame scores in ambiguous situations) predicted paranoia 
above and beyond the influence of gender, ethnicity, extant attributions measures, Paranoia-
Suspiciousness Questionnaire Hostility subscale, and psychosis proneness as measured by the 
Chapman Perceptual Aberration Scale. Combs et al. (2007c) demonstrated an advantage for the 
AIHQ over previous measures of personalizing blame, which were uncorrelated with these 
outcomes in the same sample.2 The blame score across all intentionality scenarios correlated 
significantly with paranoia and hostility scales; only Hostility Bias in ambiguous scenarios and 
Aggression Bias in accidental scenarios correlated with any other convergent predictors (self-
reported paranoia). Thus, the authors concluded that validity analyses were strong for the Blame 
scale, mixed for the Hostility bias, and weak for the Aggression bias. Therefore in subsequent 
research, greater attention has been paid specifically to the blame and hostility subscales.  
Empirical support for hostile attribution bias 
Group differences 
Group differences exist between schizophrenia and control groups in hostile attribution 
bias, as individuals with schizophrenia appear to have elevations in blame and hostility (Buck et 
al., 2016b, 2017; Kanie et al., 2014; Lahera et al., 2015). These elevations appear most extreme 
among patients with persecutory delusions. Combs and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that 
patients with persecutory delusions (and schizophrenia) had elevations on all AIHQ subscales 
compared directly to both participants with schizophrenia without persecutory delusions and 
non-clinical controls. Interestingly, non-persecutory deluded participants with schizophrenia 
looked statistically indistinguishable from non-patient controls. When examined with 
correlational analyses, the AIHQ has demonstrated consistent relationships to paranoia in non-
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""2 This was after a Bonferroni connection to account for the number of correlations computed in the study (p = .05 / 45). 
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patient control samples (Combs et al., 2007c; Combs et al., 2013), paranoid individuals with a 
range of diagnoses (Combs et al., 2009), individuals at ultra-high risk (An et al., 2010), as well 
as combined across phases of psychosis (Kim et al., 2014). It appears that these consistent 
relationships are not specific to self-report questionnaires or clinical interviews as well. 
Relationships of hostile attribution bias to paranoia, hostility and suspiciousness persist when 
assessing them in a number of ways, including objective personality test subscales (Combs et al., 
2009), and self-report questionnaires (Chang et al., 2009; Combs et al., 2007b; Combs et al., 
2009; Kim et al., 2014), interview-based ratings of hostility/suspiciousness symptoms (An et al., 
2010; Mancuso et al., 2011), as well as in-the-moment ratings of anger (Kim et al., 2014). Only 
one study (Buck et al., 2016b) demonstrates any prospective relationships, demonstrating that 
hostile attribution bias predicts prospective worsening in emotional discomfort and hostility 
symptoms. Further, different from other social cognitive biases (EB, Delvyder et al., 2013; 
Humphreys and Barrowclough, 2006; Langdon et al., 2013); PB, Delvyder et al., 2013), an 
increased hostile attribution bias presents in early psychosis as well. Hostility (An et al., 2010) 
and blame scores (le Gall et al., 2013) are elevated in first-episode psychosis compared to non-
clinical controls.  
Relationship to non-psychosis psychopathology 
In schizophrenia, early psychosis and risk-states, comorbid anxiety and depressive 
symptoms are common (Majadas et al., 2012; Wassink et al., 1999). Complicating models of 
attributional style in psychosis is the fact that attributional biases are predicted by levels of other 
symptoms of psychopathology as well; depression ratings predict AIHQ scores modestly in a 
combined patient/non-clinical sample (Combs et al., 2009), and highly in combined high-risk 
and early psychosis sample (Kim et al., 2014), a sample in which anxiety also significantly 
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predicts AIHQ as well (Kim et al., 2014). Le Gall and colleagues (2013) showed that for first-
episode psychosis patients, blame and hostility biases were associated with high anxiety and low 
self-esteem. A combined AIHQ total score was strongly correlated with not just positive 
symptoms of psychosis, but anxiety and mood symptoms as well (Mancuso et al., 2011). This 
raises questions about the specificity to psychosis of this bias, or if instead it is related generally 
to psychopathology more broadly. 
No studies have compared a depressed or anxious sample to a schizophrenia sample in 
AIHQ scores, but other statistical techniques have been employed to clarify these relationships. 
An and colleagues (2010) examined the effect of controlling for depression on the relationship 
between the AIHQ and the paranoia scale, finding that for individuals in the midst of a psychotic 
episode, controlling for depression increased the relationship between AIHQ scores (both blame 
and hostility) and the paranoia scale, but for individuals at ultra high risk for development of 
psychosis, controlling for depression decreased it, almost fully accounting for it. They also noted 
that individuals at ultra high risk had significantly lower self-esteem than non-clinical controls 
and patients in the midst of a first psychotic episode. This pattern of results seem to suggest that 
– as is the case for externalizing bias – subclinical at-risk or sub-threshold individuals might 
present with hostile attributional biases that are more closely related to depressive symptoms 
than positive symptoms of psychosis. This would be indicative of a qualitative difference 
between those with psychosis and those at risk (rather than a continuous dimensional change), 
and that these attributional biases are sustained independently of mood symptoms in later phases 
of the disorder.  
It might also be possible that measurement artifacts could be contributing to conflation of 
depression and hostile attributional style.  Several items of the AIHQ seem to overlap 
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conceptually with depressive cognitions. For example, the individual who responds with a hostile 
attribution to the item “You walk past a group of teenagers and they start to laugh” (e.g. “they 
were laughing at how I look”) might suffer primarily from paranoia, or they might just be 
affected by cognitions associated with depression, given the overlap of psychosis and dysphoria 
(Lako et al., 2012; Majadas et al., 2012). Thus, studies comparing individuals with psychosis to 
controls or examining relationships of attributional style to functioning could be impeded by not 
employing models that account for the role of depression and anxiety in affecting both variables. 
Granted, these relationships may not be mutually exclusive (i.e., it’s possible for hostile 
attributions to be relevant in both depressed and paranoid people) but the coexistence and 
confounding of these patterns leaves questions unanswered about the specific clinical relevance 
of these patterns in cognition to psychosis. 
Relationship to functioning 
To match findings demonstrating consistent relationships of skill-based social cognition 
scales (e.g. emotion perception, theory of mind) to functioning (Fett et al., 2011 for a meta-
analysis), research from the last decade has examined whether performance on the AIHQ is 
similarly related to functioning and living skills. Few have demonstrated relationships; but there 
is some evidence of relationships of the AIHQ with clinician-rated GAF scores (Lahera et al., 
2015), executive functioning (Kim et al., 2014), outdoor activity (Elnakeeb et al., 2010) and 
social engagement (Kanie et al., 2014). More studies, however, have demonstrated a lack of 
relationships to these outcomes. Mancuso and colleagues (2011) showed that a combined factor-
derived AIHQ total score (combining hostility, blame, and aggression) showed no relationships 
to measures of functioning, including a skills-based living skills measure, and interview-rated 
measures of independent living, social engagement, and work skills. In the ongoing large-scale 
16 
SCOPE study (Pinkham et al., 2016b), the same pattern emerged (no correlations to the 
subscales of the Specific Levels of Functioning [SLOF], and the UCSD Performance-Based 
Skills Assessment [UPSA]). As mentioned, it was this pattern of findings (or lack thereof) that 
led to the exclusion of the AIHQ from the SCOPE gold-standard battery of social cognition in 
schizophrenia.  
A hostile attribution bias may, however, have a more significant relationship to 
functioning in areas related to interpersonal conflict. Waldheter et al. (2005) showed that hostile 
attributional bias predicted violence on an inpatient unit both concurrently and prospectively. 
Similarly, a re-evaluation of SCOPE data according to interpersonal conflict criteria (Buck et al., 
2016b) reveals that the AIHQ is more closely related to interpersonal conflict (e.g. physical and 
verbal fights with others) and personality ratings of hostility and paranoia than independent 
living or work skills. Findings in this area are scant, but patterns thus far suggest that hostile 
attributional style is a factor that might affect one’s propensity to engage in conflicts, both 
physical and verbal, and that this may be a more specific pathway through which attributions 
could affect functioning.  
Limitations and persisting questions 
Process orientation 
Existing measures of hostile attribution bias provide access to the outcomes of biased 
social judgments. They do not provide information about the processes one engages in order to 
arrive at such judgments. Paradigms from social psychology have demonstrated the process 
through which all individuals generate social judgments often involves two sets of related 
processes, automatic and controlled influences (Payne, 2001). While automatic processes are 
efficient, involuntary, immediate, and operate outside the individual’s awareness, controlled 
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processes describe effortful, controllable and conscious. According to such a model, cognitive 
processes are comprised of automatic reactions that can be accepted, rejected, or amended 
“downstream” moments later with cognitive processing. Thus, cognitive processes (and 
particularly biases) are not the product only of immediate reactions, but one’s ability to regulate 
and control such initial reactions.  
While this has not been examined in depth, there is some reason to believe that models of 
hostile attributions in psychosis may be better described with a similar dual process model of 
automatic and controlled processes. Preliminary research suggests that individuals with paranoia 
may have difficulty regulating automatic biases under stress (as in Moritz et al., 2011, 2015), 
may be more susceptible to primes (Hooker et al., 2011) or may present opposite biases across 
implicit and explicit conditions (Lyon et al., 1994). Existing hostile attribution bias measures 
ignore such processes. For example, the large-scale SCOPE study (Pinkham et al., 2015, 2016b) 
examined only comparisons of mean scores across a clinical and control sample as well as 
correlations with symptom and functioning outcomes. This does not address questions about how 
individuals make social judgments when in acute states of illness, experiencing high levels of 
stress, or in a complex social situation more ecological valid to the social environment. And 
indeed, such process-oriented models of social cognition are regarded as a “new frontier” for 
research in the area. As described by Roberts and Pinkham (2013) in their review of future 
directions for the study of social cognition in schizophrenia, “the dual process framework 
provides a strong basis for applying social psychological principles to the study of social 
cognition in schizophrenia,” particularly in order to distinguish between “(1) diminished 
controlled processing capacity, and (2) excessively salient and aberrant automatic social 
cognitive impressions (p. 409).” 
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Theoretical model 
Another limitation of the hostile attribution bias is how it ostensibly combines several 
constructs into one assessment. Specifically, in asking individuals to ascribe levels of blame and 
hostility for a range of negative events, this measure confounds immediate biases about 
negativity of others’ actions with beliefs about the intentionality of others’ actions. The scenarios 
of the AIHQ are ambiguous and involve negative outcomes (e.g. a friend doesn’t attend a dinner, 
an important person skips an appointment). In this way, it cannot be determined whether 
individuals have an increased bias toward attributing intentionality in negative events 
specifically, or in all events. Using other instruments, individuals with schizophrenia appear to 
assign intentionality to neutral actions (e.g. “he set the alarm off” being perceived as intentional 
rather than accidental) at higher rates than non-patient controls (Peters et al., 2014; Peyroux et 
al., 2014), though these results have limited success in predicting symptoms or functional 
outcomes.  
 It is also unclear if hostile attributional style is specific to the emergence of paranoia, or if 
it emerges as a result of (or concurrently with) other comorbid symptoms like anxiety and 
depression. While it appears hostile attributional bias is related to these other forms of 
psychopathology (Combs et al., 2009; le Gall et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2014; Mancuso et al., 
2011), it is possible that in the absence of depression, this bias might be a particularly strong 
indicator of psychosis (An et al., 2010) or that there may be a more complex relationship 
according to which this thinking affects the presentation of other symptoms (e.g. ideas of 
reference, Morrison & Cohen, 2014). Finally, while particularly robust findings suggest that 
hostile attributional style has little impact on independent living skills, continued work should 
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explore the range of more appropriate criterion validity outcomes that might be impacted by this 
bias, e.g., interpersonal violence (Waldheter et al., 2005) or other conflict (Buck et al., 2017). 
Measurement issues 
There are several flaws that were first observed in the initial study of the AIHQ (Combs 
et al., 2007c). First, the subscales of the AIHQ are of unclear incremental validity. As mentioned, 
the aggression bias was regarded as having weak psychometric support initially (Combs et al., 
2007c) and subsequent research has supported this, as it has not demonstrated relationships to 
paranoia scales (Combs et al., 2007c), hostility (Combs et al., 2009) and trait anger 
questionnaires (Jeon et al., 2013), and the hostility and blame subscales of the AIHQ (Buck et 
al., 2017; Combs et al., 2009, Mancuso et al., 2011). Factor analytic work (Buck et al., 2016a) 
has demonstrated a small factor loading with the other subscales of the AIHQ as well. One 
reason for the unimpressive results of the aggression subscale might be its lack of variability, as 
reporting an aggressive action (e.g. a plan to fight an individual that slights the participant) is a 
relatively infrequent response or subject to social desirability bias (Buck et al., 2017). On the 
other hand, it is also unclear the extent to which the hostility and blame subscales diverge from 
one another, or if indeed they are two items measuring the same underlying construct. Previous 
research suggests that the two scales are highly correlated with one another, both in psychotic 
disorder and control samples (Buck et al., 2017; Combs et al., 2009, Mancuso et al., 2011).  
Second, the AIHQ has few items. It is possible that this limits its sensitivity and power to 
predict important outcomes or distinguish between clinical and control groups. Collecting a high 
number of observations in assessments of social cognitive biases is particularly important, as 
these biases reflect a general tendency to make social determination in certain ways across 
situations and contexts. The hostility and aggression biases involve open-ended responses that 
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are later rated by trained researchers (Combs et al., 2007c). This characteristic – because of its 
burden on providers and time – potentially limits the number of items, reducing variance in 
measure performance and therefore statistical power. This is concerning given the fact that the 
blame scale of the AIHQ sufficiently relates to interpersonal conflict outcomes without the help 
of the additional subscales (Buck et al., 2016b, 2017).  
Third, biases in social judgments emerge across a range of situations that vary according 
to how obvious or demanding their cues. For example, a situation where intention appears less 
ambiguous (e.g. “a person cuts you off in traffic”) may result in a hostile attribution for a higher 
number of participants from both clinical and normative samples. A more ambiguous action, on 
the other hand (e.g. “you walk by a group of teenagers and they start to laugh”) might generate 
varied responses, the patterns in which might relate to clinical factors. Because the initial large-
scale analogue sample validation study showed highest convergent correlations for the 
ambiguous items (Combs et al., 2007c), most subsequent studies only include these items to 
simplify administration and reduce testing time. While this did successfully simplify the scale, it 
potentially limits variability by both lowering the ceiling of the scale and raising its floor. And in 
fact, work in progress demonstrates that the AIHQ accidental items provide incremental validity 
above and beyond totals of the ambiguous items in predicting independent living skills and 
informant-reported levels of functioning (Buck et al., 2017). Thus, it should be noted that a 
planned and systematic varying of the demand of the situational cues might provide a more 
sensitive and holistic measurement of hostile attribution bias. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as mentioned, social cognitive biases describe 
phenomena that differ from skills in important ways that affect their measurement. While 
adaptive functioning in social cognitive skill consists of being skilled (e.g. the more skilled the 
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better), social cognitive biases differ. In interpreting others’ actions as hostile or intentional, it 
would neither be adaptive to always assume hostile intentions or to never do so. Rather, adaptive 
functioning in a social cognitive bias ought to be defined in relation to an adaptive level of 
hostile attribution according to the situational context of each item. Leading measures of hostile 
attribution bias in schizophrenia (AIHQ; Combs et al., 2007c) do not do this. Comparing mean 
values between groups allows for comparison of raw values, but it does not characterize whether 
the individual is demonstrating elevated responses because of an inability to understand 
situational cues (i.e. low discernibility) or an actual bias toward hostility (i.e. true bias). More 
sophisticated models can compare attributional responses against expected responses such that 
this fine-grained analysis can be conducted.  
Directions for future research 
The limitations identified in the previous literature on social cognitive biases in 
schizophrenia provide directions for continued research in this area. First, there is a need for 
paradigms that examine the processes through which biased judgments emerge. In particular, 
research should examine the extent to which social cognitive biases emerge through a dual 
process with both automatic (implicit) and controlled (explicit) processes. This could provide 
greater insight into determining whether individuals with hostile attribution bias appear to have 
an automatic bias, a difficulty regulating or controlling a downstream bias under stress (as 
suggested by Moritz et al., 2011), or some combination of both. Second, there are a number of 
questions related to the theory underlying the hostile attribution bias in psychosis. In particular, 
because the AIHQ subsumes overall judgments of intentionality and judgments of intentional 
negative action, it does not clearly discriminate those who tend to judge all actions as intentional 
from those with a specific bias to interpret others’ actions in a hostile manner. Preliminary 
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research suggests people with schizophrenia do tend to interpret others’ actions as more 
intentional than non-patient controls (Peyroux et al., 2011) but this measurement was not 
conducted in a manner allowing examination of automatic or controlled processes. Third, there is 
a need to test potential improvements to existing measures of hostile attribution bias, in 
particular increasing the number of items and varying them with regard to a criterion variable 
(e.g. ambiguity, valence) that pulls for the phenomenon of interest (e.g. a hostile interpretation of 
motives, externalizing blame). One specific way to address these limitations is to turn toward the 
non-patient control literature, and in particular innovative measurement technologies from social 
psychology. These paradigms provide potential answers to these limitations. 
Paradigms from social psychology  
 Two particular biases from the social psychology literature studied in large non-patient 
control samples address these limitations, the intentionality bias (Rosset et al, 2008) and the 
immorality bias (Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017). Each of these assessments has been validated in a 
non-clinical population and addresses the identified limitations in the hostile attribution bias in 
schizophrenia by (1) examining automatic and controlled processes of automatic social 
judgments with (2) a higher number of items that (3) systematically vary with regard to the 
criterion variable. Specifically, the intentionality bias provides estimates of automatic and 
controlled processes that underlie judgments of intentionality. The immorality bias task provides 
estimates of automatic and controlled processes in the individual’s tendency to specifically view 
others’ actions as evil or nefarious. This allows for a distinction in these judgments that cannot 
be made with the AIHQ in its current form. Each of these assessments may tap into the cognitive 
domains that tend to go awry in psychosis. Additionally, the intentionality and immorality biases 
are two biases that are normative to emerge among non-clinical individuals under time pressure 
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or cognitive load. Examining these measures could allow for a more precise differentiation 
between the biased judgments of non-patient controls and participants with schizophrenia. In 
particular, applying these paradigms to a clinical sample allows for researchers to determine 
whether the social cognitive biases of individuals with schizophrenia or paranoia are simply an 
exaggeration or unchecked expression of a bias shared by non-clinical samples. This contribution 
could lay the groundwork for a normalizing cognitive model of the gradient between normative 
and pathological thinking associated with psychosis.   
Intentionality bias  
 When interacting with others, one important determination in response to both positive 
and negative actions is whether the individual in question regards the other’s action as 
intentional. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have understood one’s intentionality of actions 
as being characterized by the individual desiring an outcome, believing an action will lead to the 
outcome, an intention to perform this act, and awareness of performing the act. Non-clinical 
samples generally tend to agree about overall determinations of intentionality (Malle & Knobe, 
1997).  
However, while conceptually, people tend to agree on their notions of intentionality, 
there exist individual differences with regard to how frequently individuals tend to regard others’ 
actions as intentional. This can have significant downstream effects on moral judgments (Knobe, 
2008), emotions, and behavioral responses (Wegner, 2002). For example, the individual that 
interprets a friend’s ignoring her or him at a social gathering as an intentional “snub,” rather than 
an accidental oversight is more likely to experience anger or hostility in response.  
Recent research has examined the processes underlying these kinds of judgments, as 
adults tend to have a bias to interpret ambiguous actions as intentional rather than accidental.  
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These data suggest that that judgments of intentionality are best understood in terms of a dual-
process model demonstrating that these judgments are the product of (1) immediate automatic 
judgments as well as (2) more complex or cognitively demanding attempts to revise or override 
these initial quick judgments. Specifically, participants tend to show a bias toward interpreting 
more events as the result of intentional action when under time pressure. The ability to identify 
actions as accidental results from the “ability to override, and thus inhibit” the tendency to view 
“everything anyone ever does as intentional” (p. 772; Rosset, 2008). This ability is hypothesized 
to emerge through the ability to “override an initial interpretive impulse” and consider additional 
information including social norms, others’ beliefs, goals, and intentions.  
 Rosset and colleagues (2008) have demonstrated this bias through the use of their 
intentionality bias task, which presents participants with a number of sentences, varied according 
to their pre-rated intentionality (based on pre-collected and untimed ratings), featuring 
unambiguously accidental (e.g. “he stubbed his toe”), unambiguously intentional (e.g. “he threw 
the football), prototypically accidental (e.g. “the girl popped the balloon”), and prototypically 
intentional (e.g. “he took an illegal left turn”) items. Participants are asked to determine whether 
these items describe actions that were done “on purpose” or “by accident,” and do so in several 
(counterbalanced) task blocks, varying whether individuals are required to respond under time 
pressure (2400 ms), and another with reduced time pressure (5000 ms). Participants were 
significantly more likely to regard unambiguously accidental and prototypically accidental items 
as intentional in the speeded condition, while estimates for the unambiguously intentional and 
prototypically intentional remained the same.  
 Only one study has examined this form of intentionality bias in schizophrenia. Peyroux 
and colleagues (2014) presented a group of participants with schizophrenia and non-patient 
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controls with 72 sentences that varied with regard to whether they were previously rated as 
clearly intentional or clearly unintentional, and indeed, individuals with schizophrenia were more 
likely than the control participants to rate all the sentences as the result of intentional action 
rather than by accident. Performance also was significantly related to scores on clinician-rated 
symptom interviews, including poor impulse control and excitement. Importantly, however, this 
study did not examine the ability of all participants to regulate initial responses, but rather gave 
all items without time pressure.  
 The intentionality bias is a viable candidate for improved measurement of social 
cognitive biases in schizophrenia for a number of reasons previously mentioned. First, it 
examines a cognitive bias that appears to present in continuous levels between non-patient and 
clinical samples. Second, the intentionality bias task provides a range of items of varying 
situational demands; some items are designed to be interpreted as clearly intentional, others 
clearly accidental, and the remaining items of varying clarity with this criterion. This, along with 
a higher number of items, allows for a more fine-grained examination of subtle biases in 
intentionality judgments. Finally, the intentionality bias as designed by Rosset (2008) allows for 
an examination of the process of intentionality judgments, by comparing bias levels across 
differing time pressure conditions.  
Immorality bias 
 A second bias present in a normative population also is a strong candidate for the 
understanding of social judgments in schizophrenia. Hester and colleagues have proposed that 
when tasked with making a moral judgment about the ambiguous actions of others, individuals 
demonstrate an automatic “immorality bias” (p. 8, Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017), meaning that 
immediate or automatic judgments are more likely to view others’ intentions as evil or nefarious. 
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This bias appears to be related to or draw from components of three other biases consistently 
demonstrated in non-clinical samples, in particular a bias to detect threat (Cisler & Koster, 
2010), to overvalue negative information (Hilbig, 2009; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), as well 
as the aforementioned intentionality bias (Rosset, 2008). However, the bias to assess ambiguous 
actions as immoral appears to result from an emergent process drawing upon each of these 
components yet is greater than the sum of all three. Morality judgments demonstrate a statement 
of global social beliefs about the likelihood of others’ intentional, nefarious, or harmful behavior 
(Gray, Schein & Ward, 2014). Further, these judgments are inherently specific to social 
interactions with others, as morality tends to apply to communities of individuals interacting with 
one another.  
 Hester and colleagues presented a sample of 28 sentences, stratified into categories – 
prototypically immoral (average approximately 75% immoral) and prototypically nonmoral 
(average approximately 25% immoral) – based on immorality ratings previously collected in a 
pilot study of 60 non-clinical participants providing responses without time pressure. In a similar 
paradigm to Rosset’s intentionality bias task, participants were asked to identify each sentence as 
“immoral” or “not immoral,” in two time pressure conditions (1500 ms and 5000 ms). The pre-
rated categorization of the items allowed for the use of process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991). 
Process dissociation is a mathematical procedure in which participant responses are compared to 
pre-set criterion ratings to determine the patterns in consistency with which participant responses 
adheres to the pre-set criterion. This allows estimates that differentiate automatic and controlled 
processes. Automatic processes are not consciously initiated and independent of cognitive 
control, whereas controlled processes recruit effortful conscious cognition. With reduced ability 
to use cognitive control (e.g. under time pressure or cognitive load), individuals are more likely 
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to rely on automatic processes. Hester and colleagues (2017) demonstrated that indeed, under 
time pressure, participants demonstrated a reduced ability to engage controlled processes, and 
thus were more likely to regard items as immoral, and particularly with regard to the 
prototypically non-moral items. This was interpreted ultimately that “the immorality bias 
represents a stable preference for assumptions of wrongdoing, and that controlled processing can 
be used to override this initial preference when cognitive resources are available.” (p. 29; Hester, 
Payne & Gray, 2017). 
The present study 
 The proposed study applies these innovative research paradigms – the intentionality bias 
and the immorality bias – to the study of hostile attribution bias in schizophrenia. The implicit 
measurement paradigm and process dissociation procedure provides several quantifiable 
outcomes, one for each time condition (low or high time pressure): total score, or the total 
number of items identified as immoral or intentional, as well as the extent to which participant 
responses correlate with criterion standards (inherent likelihood ratings, or ILRs) for responses 
(discernibility score, regression slope) and the extent to which participant responses are biased in 
either direction (pure bias score, regression intercept). Additionally, using a process dissociation 
procedure, this paradigm produces two additional values, an automatic bias estimate, or an 
estimate of the automatic bias to see acts as immoral or intentional, and control estimate, or an 
estimate of the extent to which one’s pattern of responding is based upon effortful cognitive 
processing. These values provide the estimates necessary to address a number of aims and 
hypotheses related to the automatic and controlled components of hostile attribution bias 
judgments in schizophrenia. 
Aims and hypotheses 
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Aim #1. Construct validity, group differences 
The first aim of the present study is to compare the levels of each of these biases in 
schizophrenia by comparing total scores. With regard to the immorality bias, while a general 
population demonstrates a bias to view ambiguous events as immoral under pressure (Hester, 
Payne & Gray, 2017), several factors suggest a schizophrenia sample will demonstrate further 
elevations compared to controls. Previous work on hostile attribution bias demonstrates those 
with schizophrenia are more likely to view ambiguous actions as hostile and intentional (Combs 
et al., 2007c; 2009), and the immorality bias appears face valid with this construct. With regard 
to the intentionality bias, previous research has demonstrated increased intentionality bias 
amongst a heterogeneous sample of individuals with schizophrenia (Peyroux et al., 2013). This 
has not been conducted, however, with a dual-process paradigm. Hypothesis: It is hypothesized 
that individuals with schizophrenia will make more attributions of intentionality (intentionality 
bias) and evil (immorality bias) than non-clinical controls.  
Aim #2. Automatic and controlled processes 
Individuals with schizophrenia present with elevations in the tendency to make hostile 
interpretations of others’ actions (Combs et al., 2007; 2009) as well as deficits in processing 
speed (Kern et al., 2011) and executive functioning (Green et al., 2000). As intentionality bias 
(Rosset, 2008) and the immorality bias (Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017) are present in pressured 
judgments of non-patient controls, it is possible that reports of biased social judgments amongst 
individuals with psychosis result from difficulty regulating or correcting initial biased judgments 
similar to a normative sample. This might point to a process of an initial biased judgment as well 
as failure to correct or adjust as a result of neurocognitive impairment. Hypothesis: It is 
hypothesized that participants with schizophrenia will demonstrate higher automatic bias across 
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time conditions and reduced controlled processing relative to controls across condition, and this 
difference will be amplified during the slow condition.  
Aim #3. Psychometric analysis. 
The third aim is to examine the utility of each task as an indicator of relevant clinical 
phenomena. Previous research suggests that hostile attribution bias (Combs et al., 2009) is 
related primarily to paranoia, hostility, persecutory delusions, and interpersonal conflict 
outcomes (Buck et al., 2016b, 2017; Combs et al., 2007; 2009) as well as predict change over 
time in hostility symptoms (Buck et al., 2016b). Hypothesis: It is hypothesized that intentionality 
and immorality biases will demonstrate convergent (concurrent relationships to hostility, 
positive, and suspiciousness/persecution symptoms), criterion (relationships to trait paranoia, 
trait hostility, observed hostility, aggressive behavior, and interpersonal conflict outcomes) and 
discriminant validity (lack of relationships between bias estimates and neurocognition). 
Exploratory Aim #1. Incremental validity  
Previous research suggests that measures of social cognitive bias provide additional 
information about hostility, paranoia and interpersonal conflict that is not captured by social 
cognitive skill measures (Buck et al., 2016a). Given that these measures are proposed to be 
improvements on assessments of these social cognitive biases, we will also examine the extent 
measures of intentionality and immorality bias predict hostility, paranoia, and interpersonal 
conflict above and beyond the SCOPE social cognitive skills battery.  
Exploratory Aim #2. Relationships beyond Neurocognition 
In our first exploratory aim, we will examine whether differences in control estimates are 
related to deficits in neurocognition. This follows from assumptions of dual process paradigms 
that the ability to control judgments stems from effortful cognitive processing (Payne, 2001), 
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including executive functioning and processing speed. This exploratory aim suggests that while 
bias estimates should be unrelated to neurocognitive functioning, the ability to control the 
expression of these biases may be specifically related to it. 
Exploratory Aim #3. Relationships to social functioning, social skills  
Previous measures of social cognitive bias have inconsistent or low relationships to 
overall measures of social skill and social functioning (Buck et al., 2016a; Mancuso et al., 2011). 
There are multiple explanations for this pattern of results, among them either the possibility that 
(1) hostile attribution bias measures are limited, or (2) hostile attribution bias is relevant only to 
paranoia, hostility, and interpersonal conflict outcomes. With the proposed improved 
measurements available in the present study, we seek to examine these explanations. Thus, we 
will also examine the relationships of each pure bias estimate with role functioning, social 
functioning and social skill.  
Exploratory Aim #4. Relationships to non-psychosis psychopathology  
Previous research suggests that hostile attribution bias is related not only to paranoia and 
persecutory delusions, but also mood and anxiety symptoms. In order to explore the specificity 
of these biases to paranoia, we will also examine the relationship of these biases to non-
psychosis psychopathology, particularly cognitive, emotional discomfort, and negative 
symptoms 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
Sample 
Data collection was completed in the final phase of the SCOPE study (Pinkham et al., 
2015, 2016). Number (n = 217) participants with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 
number (n = 154) controls were recruited to three different research sites, the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, The University of Texas at Dallas and the University of Miami Miller 
School of Medicine. Participants had diagnoses (schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder) 
confirmed with a structured clinical interview administered by trained research assistants. 
Participants with schizophrenia were included in the study if they were not hospitalized in the 
previous two months, were stable on one medication for at least six weeks, and had no changed 
in dose in two weeks. Participants in both groups were excluded if they met any of the following 
exclusion criteria: 1) current or past pervasive developmental disorder, 2) low IQ (< 70), 3) 
current or past medical or neurological conditions that may affect participation, 4) presence of 
sensory limitations, 5) presence of substance abuse in the past month, or 6) presence of substance 
dependence not in remission for at least 6 months. The full sample completed the IBT as well as 
the remainder of the proposed study battery. However, due to study protocol limitations and time 
constraints, the immorality bias task was only administered at one site (University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill), meaning that only a subset of participants (n = 42 in the schizophrenia 
group; n = 58 in the control group) completed this task.   
Measures 
32 
Social cognitive biases 
Intentionality Bias Task (Rosset, 2008) 
A slightly modified version of Rosset’s (2008) intentionality bias procedure was used to 
assess bias toward intentionality. This assessment presents participants with sentences varied 
according to their pre-rated intentionality (based on previously collected and untimed ratings), 
featuring possibly intentional (average of 25% of participants rating statement as intentional; e.g. 
“the girl popped the balloon”), and probably intentional (average of 75% of participants rating 
statement as intentional; e.g. “he took an illegal left turn”) items. Participants are asked to 
determine whether these items describe actions that were done “on purpose” or “by accident,” 
and do so in several (counterbalanced) task blocks, varying whether individuals are required to 
respond under time pressure (2400 ms), and another with reduced time pressure (5000 ms). 
Comprehension of the task and definition of anchors (i.e. “on purpose, “by accident”) was 
confirmed by trained research assistants by asking participants their understanding of the task. 
Participants completed 14 practice trials, 14 trials with low time pressure, and 14 trials with high 
time pressure. This methodological choice was made given previous findings suggesting that 
when participants complete high time pressure conditions first, they continue strategies 
employed in the first set of items and answer all items quickly, thus invalidating the 
manipulation between conditions. Raw scores were totaled as the number of “on purpose” 
responses across time pressure conditions (ranging 0 to 28).  
Immorality Bias Task (Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017)  
The final version of Hester’s (Experiment 7; Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017) short sentence 
categorization task was used to examine the immorality bias. All items were previously rated 
(without time pressure) by a general population sample according to whether they are “not 
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immoral” or “immoral,” resulting in two categories of items, characterized as “prototypically 
immoral” (average of 75% of participants rating statement as immoral) or “prototypically not 
immoral” (average of 25% of participants rating statement as immoral). These two categories (14 
items in each category) are presented to participants in two blocks, one block with high time 
pressure (1500 ms to respond) and another with low time pressure (5000 ms to respond). 
Participants will be asked to respond whether they found the act to be “immoral” or “not 
immoral.” Again, trained research assistants confirmed comprehension of the task and definition 
of anchors (i.e. “immoral,” “not immoral”), and for the same reason as for the intentionality bias, 
the low time pressure trial block preceded the high time pressure block. Raw scores were totaled 
as the number of “immoral” responses across time pressure conditions (ranging 0 to 28).  
Discernibility (slope) and pure bias (intercept) estimates 
In previous pilot testing for both the intentionality (Rosset et al., 2008) and immorality 
(Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017) assessments, data were collected on a non-clinical sample 
responding to each item without time pressure. These values represent how an individual would 
be expected to respond with normative functioning and under normal circumstances. These 
values were called “intentionality likelihood ratings” (p. 774, Rosset, 2008) when referring to the 
intentionality bias. For consistency across intentionality and immorality biases; in the present 
study we will call these values inherent likelihood ratings (ILRs). These values allow a 
determination of whether individuals respond differently than criterion values because they are 
either (1) not attending to items or discerning the target variable, or whether they are (2) 
demonstrating a pure bias that reflects a greater likelihood to interpret actions as intentional or 
immoral. Thus, in addition to raw total values, the present study will examine the extent to which 
each participant response adheres to the pre-set criterion. In order to do this, each individual’s 
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responses (binary yes or no responses) are regressed on the percentage values collected from 
pilot testing on each task (Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017; Rosset et al., 2008). These regressions 
generate two values, a slope (β) or discernibility score – indicating the extent to which 
individuals’ responses differ across items that adheres to the non-pressured non-clinical criterion 
response pattern – as well as an intercept, or pure bias estimate – indicating the extent to which 
the respondent tends to provide responses that are elevated in perceived immorality or 
intentionality. These values were collected within each participant, within each time pressure 
condition, such that each individual has a discernibility and bias estimate for each the slow and 
fast conditions for each task. 
Process dissociation procedure 
Process dissociation (Jacoby et al., 1993) is an algebraic manipulation that allows 
estimates for the automatic and controlled processes that underlie quick judgments. In such 
judgments, responses indicate presence of a target phenomenon (i.e. an immoral act) or its 
absence (i.e. a non-immoral one). Control is defined as the ability of the individual to “produce a 
particular response when they intend to, but not produce the response when they intend not to” 
(p. 183, Payne, 2001). When applied to the present study, a similar logic can apply, assuming the 
previously demonstrated automatic biases of non-clinical samples toward attributing evil and 
intentionality, using Payne’s (2001) previous work as a guide. For example, an item is defined as 
“prototypically immoral” by pre-set criterion ratings (i.e. an average of 75% of untimed 
participants regarded the item as immoral), the participant attributing immorality is encountering 
a “congruent” condition. This means that both the participant’s automatic response and 
controlled response would result in the same determination (immoral action). The probability of 
identifying a congruent condition as immoral is quantified as the expression of control 
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probability, C, and the probability of automatic response occurring with the failure of control, 
A(1 – C): 
PCONGRUENT = C + A(1 – C) 
In incongruent conditions, however, the participant attempts to make a judgment wherein their 
automatic response (to see intentionality or immorality) and controlled response (the item was 
rated only by 25% of untimed participants as immoral) are in conflict. In this situation, the 
likelihood of that the participant will identify the item as intentional or immoral is the probability 
of the expression of the automatic bias where there exists the failure of control, A(1 –  C): 
PINCONGRUENT = A(1 – C)  
Based on these assumptions, one can quantify separate estimates of controlled and automatic 
responding. Control estimates are defined as the difference between identifying the target in 
congruent (i.e. “correct”) conditions and incongruent (i.e. “incorrect”) conditions: 
C = PCONGRUENT – PINCONGRUENT 
Finally, with these conditions, one can solve for the automatic bias estimate as well: 
A = PINCONGRUENT/(1 – C)  
According to this paradigm, therefore, controlled processes are defined as “those in which 
responses are successfully modulated by intentions” (p. 183) such that the individual is correct in 
processing the stimulus. Automatic processes, on the other hand, are processes that “operate 
regardless of whether they facilitate intentional performance or interfere with it” (p. 183) and 
therefore reflect a systematic preference to regard items as immoral or intentional. Each of these 
estimates are calculated using the same procedure, and categorized data according to the pre-set 
criterion in pilot testing with untimed control participants (Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017; Rosset, 
2008).  
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Psychiatric symptoms 
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, Kay et al., 1987) is an interview-
based measure comprised of 30 items assessing for positive and negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia, as well as general psychopathology symptoms. These interviews were conducted 
and rated by experienced research assistants who were trained to adequate reliability (ICC > .80 
with a gold standard rater). In the present study, we generated the five-factor solution subscales 
proposed by Bell and colleagues (1994): cognitive, emotional discomfort, hostility, positive, and 
negative symptoms, along with the specific item related to suspiciousness/persecution symptoms. 
Totals for each factor as calculated by Bell and colleagues (1994) are examined, as well as the 
specific score on the suspiciousness/persecution item separately.  
Neurocognition 
A verbal task of neurocognition was used in the discriminant validity analysis, given the 
paper-and-pencil vignette structure of the AIHQ. This was assessed with the WRAT, a 42-item 
task involving participants to read words at varying levels of language difficulty. The WRAT, 
though brief, is a highly significant predictor of both verbal and full-scale IQ (Wiens et al., 
1993).  
Social cognitive skills 
The final phase SCOPE battery was used to assess social cognitive skills in the present 
study. This battery consists of five measures. The Penn Emotion Recognition Task (ER-40; 
Kohler et al., 2003) is a 40-item assessment of emotion perception. Each item consists of a color 
photograph of a face that is expressing one of four states, happy, sad, angry, afraid, or neutral. 
Items represent a balanced presentation of gender, age, ethnicity, and intensity of emotion 
expressed. Participants are instructed to identify the emotion expressed as soon as possible after 
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seeing the face. Scores on this task range from 0 to 40, with each score representing the number 
of items answered correctly. 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (Eyes; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a 36-item 
assessment of theory of mind. Each item is presented as the eyes region of the face expressing a 
complex mental state. Participants are asked to determine what mental state is being depicted. 
Four options are presented with each photo. Scores range from 0 to 36, with each score 
representing the number of items answered correctly. 
The Bell Lysaker Emotion Recognition Task (BLERT; Bryson, Bell, & Lysaker, 1997) 
assesses participants’ ability to correctly affect in one actor presenting the same statement with 
varying emotional tones: happy, sad, afraid, disgusted, surprised, angry, or neutral.  Each item is 
a ten-second clip of the face and shoulders of a male actor expressing the same statement with 
one of the affective tones.  Scores range from 0 to 21 on this task, with higher scores indicating 
the number of correctly identified items (ranging from 0 to 21). 
The Hinting Task (Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995) involves participants interpreting ten 
brief written stories that require them to identify and make inferences involving others’ mental 
states. Scores range from 0 to 20 on this task, with higher scores indicating better performance. 
The Awareness of Social Inference Test - Social Inference: Minimal Subscale (TASIT, 
McDonald et al., 2004) consists of Yes/No questions related to four video-taped social vignettes 
requiring participants to infer individual motives which may contradict verbal communication 
(e.g., sarcasm or “white lies”). The TASIT is scored based on number of correct responses out of 
60 possible, and includes subscales that distinguish between simple sarcasm (sarcastic phrases 
with a meaning that matches the utterance) and paradoxical sarcasm (phrases that imply the 
opposite of what they appear to express). While these both require the participant to represent the 
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internal state of the speaker to infer meaning, paradoxical items require a more complex 
judgment of meaning. Performance is indexed as total number correct. 
Trait paranoia 
The Persecution and Deservedness Scale (Melo et al., 2009) is a 10-item self-report scale 
designed to assess paranoia and perceived deservedness of persecution. Items describe traits or 
behaviors related to paranoia to which participants respond with a Likert scale response (scale 0 
to 4) identifying the extent to which they identify with each item as well as a follow up item with 
the same scale identifying the extent to which they feel they deserve the reported persecution. 
This is designed to distinguish between bad me (depressive type) and poor me (non-affective 
psychosis type) paranoia in schizophrenia (Melo et al., 2009), though this distinction was not 
explored in the current study. Scores range from 0 to 40 with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of paranoia. 
Trait hostility 
The Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5, Krueger et al., 2012) is a 220-item self-
report questionnaire evaluating potentially pathological personality dimensions related to DSM-5 
disorders. Items consist of statements related to behaviors or personality dimensions and Likert 
scale (0 to 3) responses for participants. In the present study, participants were administered the 
ten items related to the Hostility Scale of the PID-5 (PID-5-HS). Total scores thus ranged from 0 
to 30, with higher scores indicating greater hostility.  
Observed hostility 
The Observable Social Cognition: A Rating Scale (OSCARS; Healey et al., 2015) is a 
rating scale of the participant’s performance in a number of arenas related to social cognition, 
including, for example, correctly understanding others’ thoughts and intentions or jumping to 
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conclusions. There are eight items with accompanying Likert scale responses (1 = no evidence of 
difficulty to 7 = evidence of extreme difficulty). In the present study, we used the hostility item, 
which assesses whether the individual has difficulty “interpreting social interactions in a 
malevolent or hostile manner.”  For the current study, the informant-rated scale was used. 
Informants were identified by the participants and were high contact clinicians, family members, 
or close friends. 
Role functioning 
The Specific Levels of Functioning Scale (SLOF; Schneider & Struening, 1983) is a 31-
item informant-rated measure of social functioning, community functioning, and effectiveness in 
activities of daily living. The present study examined the social acceptability subscale, which 
comprises the following items: regularly arguing with others, having physical fights with others, 
destroying property, physically abusing self, being fearful/crying/clinging, and taking property 
from others without permission. Ratings on the SLOF are made on a Likert scale as well (1 to 5, 
with higher scores indicating better functioning). Informants were the same as those selected for 
collection of the OSCARS. Given informant response rates, the sample for all analyses involving 
the SLOF (all conducted only in the schizophrenia group) were smaller than the full sample (n = 
135). 
Social skills 
The Social Skills Performance Assessment (SSPA; Patterson et al, 2001) is an observer-
rated assessment of social skill performance in two three-minute role-play conversations with a 
confederate. First, the participant is instructed to role-play a conversation with a new neighbor 
who has just moved to the area and second, a conversation with a landlord who had failed to fix a 
leak in the participant’s house. The SSPA evaluates interest, speech fluency, clarity, focus, 
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affect, social appropriateness, submissiveness/persistence, negotiation ability, and overall 
effectiveness with scores summed and averaged into an overall score (ranging from 1 to 5). 
Average scores were calculated across both role-plays for the current study. 
Procedure 
Graduate-level staff, who had experience working with individuals with schizophrenia,  
conducted all interview-based measures. These research assistants were trained to reliability 
consistently across study sites. As mentioned, due to study protocol limitations with regard to 
requisite time for administration, the intentionality bias task was conducted at all research sites, 
but the immorality bias task was conducted only at one of three sites. Data collection took across 
two study visits, which were separated by an interval of 2 to 4 weeks. All variables reported here 
include only data from the initial study visit.   
Data analytic plan  
An overview of all aims, hypotheses, and planned statistical tests for main study aims can 
be found in Table 1, and for all exploratory aims in Table 2. Portions of analyses for hypotheses 
#1 through #3 utilize a multilevel model. Each task requires the participant to give a binary 
response to every single item. Although this kind of data has often been analyzed by collapsing 
participants’ responses into a single value for each condition while conducting a within-subjects 
ANOVA, multilevel modeling conveys a few key advantages (Bauer & Curran, 2015). 
Multilevel models allow for the analysis of incomplete data, and they allow for the use a link 
function that treats the distribution of responses as binary, rather than normal. These models also 
account for within-subject variability (e.g., some participants might have a high baseline for 
immoral or intentional judgments, whereas other participants might have a low baseline). 
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The present analysis examined the effects of group, time pressure, and the inherent 
likelihood ratings (ILR) of each item. The baseline values are particularly important, given the 
fact that each item elicits a different baseline response (i.e. how likely it is that the individual 
will find each item to be the result of intentional or immoral action on the part of the hypothetical 
target). These baseline values were drawn from previous research on the immorality bias (Hester, 
Payne & Gray, 2017) and intentionality bias (Rosset et al., 2008). Thus, the present omnibus 
analysis is a multilevel model in which each item is nested within participant. The population 
expected response (i.e. “percent”) is entered as a level 1 predictor, while the study manipulations 
(i.e. schizophrenia vs. control [“group”] and time pressure [“time”]) are entered as level 2 
predictors, as shown below. 
Each set of hypotheses and analyses are identical for the two examined measures here. 
For simplicity we will review hypotheses for each assessment in sequence, beginning with the 
intentionality bias task and then the immorality bias task.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
Demographics 
All demographic analyses are reported in Table 3. The schizophrenia and control groups 
differed on one variable, education. The control group completed significantly more years of 
school than the schizophrenia group. With regard to study outcomes, there were significant 
differences between patients and controls in paranoia (higher in schizophrenia; PaDS), hostility 
(higher in schizophrenia; PID5-HS), social functioning (higher in controls; SSPA), and 
neurocognition estimate (higher in controls; WRAT).  
Because only one of three of the study sites (Chapel Hill, NC) had participants complete 
the CIST, this subset was compared to the remainder of the full sample (at the Dallas, TX and 
Miami, FL sites) with regard to demographic variables and study outcomes. While there were no 
significant demographic differences between the subsets, they differed in a number of study 
outcome variables related to symptoms and functioning. Specifically, relative to the full sample, 
the CIST-subset was less paranoid, less hostile, less suspicious, experienced fewer interpersonal 
conflicts, and were higher functioning in work activities, independent living skills, social skills, 
and had better overall neurocognition.3 Differences between the schizophrenia and control 
groups in hostility (PID5-HS) and neurocognition estimate (WRAT) were significantly smaller 
in the CIST-only subset. Overall, these differences reflect a tendency for all participants in the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""3These analysis results refer to the main effect of subset, however this applies to patients only (because only patients completed 
these measures) for all the variables except for social skills and neurocognition, which both patients and control participants 
completed. With regard to social skills and neurocognition, there is a main effect of subset across schizophrenia and control 
groups. 
43 
CIST-only subset (both patients and controls) to be higher functioning and better educated and 
for specifically the schizophrenia sample participants in this subset, to be significantly less 
impaired, paranoid, and hostile. This might be the result of site differences, as the CIST-only 
subset was collected in a less urban, more affluent and higher educated area (Chapel Hill, NC) 
than the other two sites (Dallas, TX and Miami, FL), which were more urban and less affluent. 
This may be of particular interest given the relationship between schizophrenia incidence and 
urbanicity (Vassos et al., 2012).  
Intentionality Bias Task (IBT) Analyses  
Aim #1. Construct validity, group differences 
After running the omnibus multilevel model, we examined the main effect of group to 
determine whether individuals with schizophrenia demonstrated an elevated bias toward 
intentionality. There was indeed a main effect of group, F(1,7835) = 6.00, p < .014. At the mean 
ILR rating, individuals in the schizophrenia group (M = 0.43, 95% CI [0.41, 0.46]) were more 
likely to identify items as intentional than the control group (M = 0.38, 95% CI [0.35, 0.41]). 
Aim #2. Automatic and controlled processes 
We tested the same full model as described above for a (1) a main effect of time pressure 
(expecting higher scores in high-time pressure) as well as (2) a two-way group by time pressure 
interaction (expecting greatest group differences in low time pressure condition), to examine our 
hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia will be differentially affected by the time pressure 
manipulation relative to controls. There was no main effect of the time pressure manipulation, 
F(1,7835) = 0.73, p = .40. There was also no significant time pressure by group interaction, 
F(1,7835) = 0.37, p = .54, indicating that the rate of intentionality judgments of individuals in the 
schizophrenia sample were not differentially affected by the time pressure manipulation.  
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To examine the extent to which these differences were the result of automatic or 
controlled processing, we also examined parameters derived from the process dissociation 
procedure. First, with regard to the PDP-generated control estimate, there was a main effect of 
group, F(1, 355) = 12.38, p < .001, such that individuals with schizophrenia demonstrated lower 
control estimates than control participants across both conditions, and a main effect of time 
pressure, F(1, 355) = 45.97, p < .001, such that overall, participants demonstrated lower control 
in the fast condition than the slow condition. There was no time pressure by group interaction, 
F(1, 355) = 0.80, p = .37. 
With regard to the automatic estimate, there was a main effect of group, F(1, 360) = 6.72, 
p = .01, such that individuals with schizophrenia demonstrated higher automatic bias than control 
participants across both conditions. There was no effect of time pressure condition, F(1, 360) = 
1.09, p = .30, nor was there a group by time pressure interaction, F(1, 360) = 0.05, p = .82. 
Taking these results together, it appears that individuals in general (regardless of 
diagnosis) make more judgments of intention under time pressure as a result of diminished 
recruitment of controlled processes. However, failure of control is not specific to individuals 
with schizophrenia. Instead, individuals with schizophrenia are more likely than controls to over-
attribute intentionality as a result of an automatic bias that persists across higher and lower 
pressure conditions.   
Aim #3. Psychometric analysis. 
 Convergent validity analyses were conducted with the expectation that the IBT bias 
scores would demonstrate significant relationships with hostility, positive, and suspiciousness 
symptoms as measured by the PANSS. This was not the case, as none of the IBT bias scores 
were significantly related to these symptom categories (Table 4).  
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 Criterion validity analyses examined whether bias scores were related to related real-
world outcomes, including interpersonal conflict, trait hostility, trait paranoia, and observed 
hostility. The IBT total score was significantly positively related to all of these outcomes; higher 
levels of bias toward intentionality related increased interpersonal conflict, hostility and 
paranoia. Pure bias and PDP-generated automatic estimates were not as consistently related to 
criterion outcomes; the pure bias estimate was only related to the hostility scale and trended 
toward significance in its relationship to the social acceptability scale of the SLOF. The PDP-
generated automatic estimate was not related to any of these outcomes. Discriminant validity 
analyses showed that while the IBT total score and PDP-derived automatic bias scores were 
unrelated to the neurocognition estimate, the pure bias score had an unexpected negative 
relationship to the WRAT (Table 4).  
Overall, these results indicate a number of patterns. First, it appears that the bias toward 
intentionality is not related to clinically-rated symptoms, however it does relate to functioning 
and separates from our estimate of neurocognition. Second, these results were most consistent 
when examining overall IBT total scores, rather than the pure bias score (which did no achieve 
discriminant validity from verbal intelligence) or the PDP-generated automatic estimate. 
Exploratory Aim #1. Incremental validity  
To examine the incremental validity of the IBT above and beyond the extant gold 
standard social cognitive skills battery in SCOPE, hierarchical linear regressions were performed 
to examine impact on significant criterion outcomes above and beyond the influence of the 
SCOPE battery. In all four hierarchical regressions, the gold standard social cognitive battery did 
not result in a significant model predicting any of the outcomes. When entered at step 2, the IBT 
total score significantly improved model fit with regard to interpersonal conflict (ΔR2 = .03, p = 
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.03), trait paranoia (ΔR2 = .02, p = .03), and trait hostility (ΔR2 = .02, p = .03), suggesting that the 
bias toward intentionality may provide unique information about criterion outcomes above and 
beyond the influence of skill-based measures. The full model predicting trait paranoia was 
significant overall (R2 = .06, p = .04), while those for interpersonal conflict R2 = .08, p = .09). 
and observed hostility approached significance (R2 = .09, p = .08). These full models are reported 
in Table 6. 
Exploratory Aim #2. Relationships beyond neurocognition 
Both discernibility and PDP-derived control estimates were significantly related to 
neurocognition in the control group. In the schizophrenia group, however, only the PDP control 
estimate was significantly related to neurocognition (Table 5).  
Exploratory Aim #3. Relationships to social functioning, social skills  
The IBT was related to a number of general social and role functioning outcomes, as IBT 
total score and PDP-derived automatic bias estimate were significantly related to overall role 
functioning with greater bias being related to impaired functioning. The pure bias estimate was 
also negatively related to improved social skills, and all three IBT bias parameters were related 
to independent living skills with higher bias being related to poorer living skills. (Table 5). 
Exploratory Aim #4. Relationships to non-psychosis psychopathology  
With regard to negative and general symptoms, the IBT was significantly related to 
PANSS emotional discomfort symptoms; no other relationships were significant (Table 5).  
Supplemental analysis #1. Differential response patterns by group. 
In the process of examining the omnibus multi-level model, one additional effect 
emerged that is consistent with extant research in non-clinical samples (Hester, Payne & Gray, 
2017). Specifically, there existed an ILR by group interaction, F(1, 7835) = 20.82, p < .001, such 
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that responses to items were most different between groups on items that have a low ILR rating. 
This pattern suggests that individuals with schizophrenia are most biased in items that are the 
least normatively regarded as intentional (Figure 1).  
Categorizing Immoral Sentences Task (CIST) Analyses4 
Aim #1. Construct validity, group differences 
With regard to the CIST, there was no main effect of group, F(1,2383) = 1.06, p = .31, 
demonstrating that individuals with schizophrenia were no more likely to identify items as 
immoral than control participants.  
Aim #2. Automatic and controlled processes 
There also was no main effect of the time pressure manipulation, F(1,2383) = 0.13, p = 
.72, nor a time pressure by group interaction, F(1,2383) = 0.02, p = .89, indicating the time 
pressure interaction did not affect the responding of participants overall nor specifically 
schizophrenia participants. It is important to note that one central result in a non-clinical sample 
(Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017) was replicated as there did exist an interaction between ILR and 
time pressure condition combined across groups, F(1,2383) = 5.54, p = .019, such that all 
participants appeared to make more judgments of immorality in the fast time condition in the 
low-ILR (probably nonmoral) items (Figure 2). 
With regard to the PDP-generated control estimates, there was no effect of group, F(1, 
92) = 0.39, p = .53, or time pressure, F(1, 92) = 1.58, p = .21, however there was a time pressure 
by group interaction, F(1, 92) = 5.17, p = .03. Individuals with schizophrenia had higher control 
estimates (Mdifference = 0.04, CI [-.17, .08]) in the fast condition but lower control in the slow 
condition (Mdifference = -0.14, CI [-.24, -.04]). With regard to the automatic estimate, there was no 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""4The correlation between the total scores of the IBT and CIST are evaluated and found to be non-significant, r = .13, p = .21. 
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main effect of group, F(1, 92) = 0.61, p = .43, time pressure condition, F(1, 92) = 0.01, p = .34, 
nor a group by time pressure interaction, F(1, 92) = 0.91, p = .34.  
Overall, individuals with schizophrenia do not seem to differ from controls with regard to 
the bias toward immorality, with one exception. When making such judgments, individuals with 
schizophrenia are indeed differentially affected by a time pressure manipulation; however, this 
failure of control did not result in a clear bias toward immorality. Generally speaking, these 
results do not support the presence of an elevated immorality bias in schizophrenia, nor one that 
is impacted by the recruitment of automatic and controlled cognitive processes, but rather, that 
individuals with schizophrenia are more likely to fail to recruit controlled cognitive processes in 
making such determinations relative to controls.  
Aim #3. Psychometric analysis. 
 None of the convergent, criterion, or discriminant validity analyses revealed significant 
relationships (Table 4).  
Exploratory Aim #1. Incremental validity  
Because there were no significant relationships between the CIST and criterion outcomes, 
exploratory aim #1 was not completed for the CIST. 
Exploratory Aim #2. Relationships beyond neurocognition 
On the CIST, only the PDP control estimate was related to neurocognition in the control 
group. There was no relationship between either estimate of control and neurocognition in the 
schizophrenia group (Table 5).  
Exploratory Aim #3. Relationships to social functioning, social skills  
49 
Only the pure bias estimate trended toward significance in its relationship to social skills 
as measured by the SSPA. None of the CIST parameters were related to any other measures of 
social and role functioning (Table 5).  
Exploratory Aim #4. Relationships to non-psychosis psychopathology  
None of the CIST parameters were related to any other symptom categories (Table 5). 
Supplemental analysis #1. Differential response patterns by group. 
Following the significant result of the analogous supplemental analysis on the IBT, we 
tested the same effect in CIST results, and found there was no ILR by group interaction, F(1, 
2383) = 0.22, p = 0.64.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
The current study presents quite different conclusions across the two attribution biases 
examined, the intentionality bias and immorality bias. Results suggest that a bias toward 
intentionality may be a clinically relevant feature of psychotic disorders. This bias appears to be 
modestly related to interpersonal conflict, paranoia, trait hostility and observed hostility, though 
is not related to clinically-rated symptoms. Further, it provides variance predicting real-world 
interpersonal conflict outcomes above and beyond the influence of the gold-standard SCOPE 
battery. The immorality bias, on the other hand, does not appear to be related to any clinical or 
functional characteristics present in schizophrenia. Additionally, the present study provides new 
insights into methodological questions in the study of schizophrenia. These results lay the 
groundwork for continued research into the cognition involved in attributions of intention in 
schizophrenia, as well as implications for improvements using dual process paradigms in this 
population. 
Intentionality Bias 
Several previous findings on this bias were replicated and supported in the present study. 
First, individuals with schizophrenia sample appeared more likely to see others’ actions as 
intentional relative to controls, corroborating previous work (Peyroux et al., 2014). Second, there 
appears to be a failure of control that takes place when the individual (regardless of diagnosis) 
has diminished access to cognitive resources (i.e. under time pressure), replicating initial work 
by Rosset (2008). Results deviated, however, in that this failure of control did not result in an 
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increased likelihood for study participants to identify items as intentional. The primary new 
contributions of the current study are that it demonstrates that this bias can be understood as (1) 
comprising both automatic and controlled components, (2) separate from clinically-rated 
positive, suspiciousness and hostility symptoms (differing from other attributional biases; Combs 
et al., 2007), and (3) related to interpersonal conflict outcomes above and beyond the influence 
of social cognitive skill.  
With regard to automatic and controlled components of these judgments, individuals with 
schizophrenia showed both diminished control and increased bias according to estimates 
generated from process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2001). This indicates that individuals 
with schizophrenia both are less apt to control their judgments and present with a bias to 
interpret intentional motives. We hypothesized that the increased rate of intentionality judgments 
in schizophrenia was a result of both an elevated bias as well as a diminished ability to regulate 
this bias under pressure; this was partially supported. The deficit in control and increase in bias 
in the schizophrenia group was not the result of differential response to pressure, as there were 
no interactions between time pressure and group membership. Individuals with schizophrenia do 
not appear to be differentially affected by the failure of control that occurs under time pressure. 
Instead, they appear more biased and less controlled regardless of pressure. Results here de-
emphasize the centrality of a difficulty in regulating stress that leads to these biased social 
judgments, but rather a bias that is elevated regardless of context. Previous work has suggested 
that individuals with schizophrenia – and particularly those with persecutory delusions – not only 
struggle to identify and interpret the mental states of others, but also additionally overattribute 
intention to others (Moritz et al., 2011; Montag et al., 2011; Peyroux et al., 2014). The present 
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study provides support for the presence of this bias in schizophrenia and suggests that this bias is 
stable in the face of time pressure. 
Second, this intentionality bias did not demonstrate convergent validity with 
hypothesized outcomes in the present study, including hostility, positive, and suspiciousness 
symptoms. This finding adds to a base of literature already rife with conflicting findings. 
Previous research suggests that detecting intention in clearly negative events appears related to 
persecutory symptoms (Buck et al., 2016b, 2017; Combs et al., 2007, 2009); in neutral events, 
however, this bias appears related to a diverse array of symptoms, including irritability and 
disorganization (Peyroux et al., 2014). While a clear model is unclear from the current results, 
results suggest that the intentionality bias captures a cognitive style non-redundant with clinically 
rated persecutory symptoms. In one exploratory analysis, the intentionality bias did appear 
related to general emotional distress symptoms (e.g. anxiety and dysphoria). This could suggest 
that an increased intentionality bias might be reflective of a presentation more consistent with 
depression, for example, if an individual regards others’ intentional actions as stronger 
determinants of events in the world (rather than their own).  These findings also raise questions 
as to whether this bias is specific to schizophrenia or more generally related to psychopathology. 
At present, firm conclusions about this relationship remain unclear, however, it is possible that a 
bias to regard all actions as intentional may increase unpleasant emotions, for example, fear or 
dislike of others when one experiences negative events. 
Third, this bias showed significant relationships to a number of criterion outcomes, 
including interpersonal conflict, observed hostility, trait hostility, and trait paranoia, and it 
predicted these outcomes above and beyond the influence of all five measures comprising the 
gold-standard SCOPE social cognition battery (Pinkham et al., 2016). Further, exploratory 
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analyses demonstrated relationships with global living skills, social skills, and social functioning; 
these relationships – though small and not explicitly hypothesized – also are stronger than those 
demonstrated with extant measures of bias (Pinkham et al., 2016). These increases might be a 
result of the improvements to attributional style measurement tested here, including more items 
(Buck et al., 2017), a specific focus on determinations of intentionality (Peyroux et al., 2014), the 
minor stress-induction involved in timed responses (Moritz et al., 2011), or some combination of 
these and other factors.  
Finally, a supplemental analysis provided additional potential explanations for the nature 
of the differences between individuals with schizophrenia and controls with regard to biased 
social reasoning. These analyses revealed an interaction between item characteristics (ILR) and 
group membership, such that less paradigmatically-intentional items produced the greatest group 
differences. This suggests that the differences between individuals with schizophrenia and 
controls in biased social judgments are greatest when items are paradigmatically accidental, not 
when they are ambiguous or paradigmatically intentional. This is consistent with recent 
suggestions that the abbreviation of attributional style measures to include only ambiguous 
events (as in the AIHQ) may be misguided, and that accidental items should be included as well 
(Buck et al., 2017). While in subclinical populations, ambiguous events elicit differential 
cognitive patterns, (Combs et al., 2007), in clinical studies, it appears that it’s specifically the 
neutral or apparently accidental situations that may be interpreted differently in schizophrenia. 
Overall, these results are encouraging and could provide additional insights into 
understanding aberrant social cognition in schizophrenia and the ways in which it might result in 
social dysfunction. This bias exists regardless of time pressure and is not exclusively an 
expression of a normative bias that emerges in the face of aberrant failure of control (Rosset, 
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2008). Instead, this bias is simply elevated in schizophrenia. Given its correlational nature, the 
current study cannot speak to a temporal model of the relationship between these biases, 
symptoms, and functioning. While additional prospective studies are needed, with further 
support, possibilities for explaining the impact on behavior and functioning of this bias are 
numerous. It could be the case that the tendency to over-attribute intentionality to others’ actions 
results in more fearful, angry and dysphoric internal states when the individual experiences 
negative social events. This elevated bias could result in misunderstandings that increase 
disagreements, worsen communication, or lead to conflict. This might be exacerbated when these 
interpretations of intentionality occur in situations that typically regarded as accidental. Further, 
such dysfunction could compound as individuals avoid social interactions that they find 
threatening or confusing. Whether this bias is a cause, result, or a co-occurring feature of 
psychotic symptoms, it appears to identify a characteristic common to psychosis and its 
associated negative outcomes.  
Immorality Bias 
 The existence of an elevated immorality bias in schizophrenia, on the other hand, did not 
receive support from the present study. There were no differences between groups or time 
pressure conditions, nor an interaction between them. It is notable, however, that the overall 
trend demonstrating a bias toward immorality (as in Hester, Payne & Gray, 2017) was indeed 
replicated, as items typically regarded as non-moral were more likely to be labeled as immoral 
when individuals were subject to time pressure. The present study provides additional support for 
the existence of a bias toward immorality under pressure overall; it provides no evidence, 
however, that this bias presents any differently in schizophrenia. The only significant group 
difference was a diminished control estimate among individuals with schizophrenia under time 
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pressure. As there were no differences in overall judgments or estimates of automatic bias, this 
appears to suggest that individuals with schizophrenia were simply less skilled at reading and 
responding to these items quickly, a pattern that (given the lack of bias) leads to random (and not 
biased) responding. Such a pattern would be expected among individuals with the cognitive 
impairments typically present in schizophrenia (Green et al., 2004; Twamley, Jeste & Bellack, 
2003).  
 Importantly, there were two characteristics of the study that may have affected study 
results. First, the CIST analysis sample was considerably smaller than that of other study 
analyses. However, even with an anticipated larger sample, the data provided here do not provide 
support for medium or large effects. Second, and perhaps more importantly, there were a myriad 
of differences between the CIST-analysis subset and the overall sample with regard to 
symptoms, functioning, and other outcomes. These participants were all drawn from the research 
site that is less urban, more affluent and better educated. This sample demonstrated attenuated 
differences from controls with regard to neurocognition, functioning, and hostility, and thus they 
may not reflect a representative sample of individuals with schizophrenia.   
However, while the diminished statistical power and characteristics of the sample require 
such interpretations to remain speculative, there still may be characteristics of this bias or 
measure that are flawed for clinical uses. It is possible that judgments of morality are simply not 
associated with the cognition specific to psychosis. As previous results have demonstrated that 
threat detection defined broadly is aberrant in schizophrenia (Green & Phillips, 2004), it may be 
the case that psychosis-related attributions are those that involve clear threat. Some immoral 
situations are removed from immediate danger but simply reflect bad behavior (e.g. “He lied to 
his sister”). Thus, it may also be the case that the structure of the task resulted in statements of 
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individuals’ fixed abstract belief systems, rather than their responses to real-world interactions. 
In addition, previous studies (Combs et al., 2007; 2009) use second-person (rather than third-
person) hypothetical vignettes, and it may be the case that these procedures more effectively 
elicit personal experiences. Future research might consider combining some of the improvements 
studied here with these strengths of extant measures. 
Dual-process methodology in the study of attributions in psychosis 
 The present study examined not only two specific attribution biases, but also several 
methods aimed at examining cognitive biases in psychopathology in general, in particular, (1) 
time pressure manipulations, and (2) use of estimates of controlled and automatic responding, 
both those from individual-level logistic regression analyses and process dissociation procedure. 
Overall, each of these methods hold promise in the study of biases in psychotic disorders, but 
present results raise an array of questions related to them.  First, the use of a time pressure 
manipulation appeared to be an effective method to examine changes in reliance on automatic 
and controlled processes that occur under stress. All individuals appeared to experience a failure 
of control under time pressure, but this did not lead to an increase in intentionality or immorality 
judgments. However, participants in the schizophrenia group presented with both an elevation in 
automatic bias and an amplified and consistent failure of control.  
Previous methods used to examine attribution biases (AIHQ, Combs et al., 2007; ARAT, 
Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2009) in schizophrenia have generally used total scores across 
items, and have not systematically examined agreement or disagreement from consensus-
established item characteristics. The methods piloted here to examine this more specifically – 
discernibility (i.e. the agreement between each participant and normative responding), pure bias 
(i.e. the intercept of these models reflecting overall bias), PDP-automatic (i.e. preference for a 
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biased response based on dichotomous categories), and PDP-control (i.e. non-correspondence 
with pre-set dichotomous categories) – did not overall improve relationships to outcomes. 
Counter to expectations, results indicated that – in general – total scores appeared to be the best 
predictors of criterion outcomes in schizophrenia. On one hand, this might demonstrate that these 
new parameters are simply ineffective psychometric tools. On the other hand, this could indicate 
that total scores are the strongest predictors because aberrant attributions emerge from co-
operation of automatic and controlled processes.  
Limitations 
Several limitations should be mentioned. Overall, one major limitation of the present 
study is drawing conclusions about social decision-making based on a controlled laboratory 
paradigm very removed from day-to-day life. The intentionality bias and immorality bias tasks 
are designed to elicit cognitive biases that might impact real-world emotions and behavior. 
However, they are laboratory-based tasks completed on computers. This method, though easily 
controlled and replicated, may present with decrements in ecological validity that deflate 
relationships between this paradigm and functional outcomes. This is a persisting question in this 
area, as there appears to exist a tradeoff involving internal and external validity between 
measurements that are distal or proximal to relevant functional outcomes (Brenner, Curbow & 
Legro, 1995).   
There are additional limitations specific to methodology. In addition to concerns about 
sample size and site effects, the current study is also limited by a lack of prior results to inform 
correct specification of the reaction time tasks. With more time and resources, pilot testing of the 
paradigm with larger samples of both individuals with schizophrenia and non-clinical controls 
could help ensure that the task is designed properly for both populations. Second, though the 
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present study examines improvements in measurement of hostile attribution bias, an existing 
measure of this construct (i.e. the AIHQ) was not collected on this sample; instead, clinically-
rated hostility, positive, and suspiciousness symptoms were used as convergent outcomes. 
Finally, some measurements of criterion outcomes used in the current study are proxies or brief 
versions. The WRAT, for instance, is a brief intelligence measure that, while having empirical 
support for this use (Weins et al., 1993), is still less psychometrically robust than the full-scale 
WAIS or MATRICS battery (Kern et al., 2009).  
Directions for future research 
 For the intentionality bias, future research should both examine and test additional 
opportunities to improve the measure, as well as build an understanding of the model of its 
emergence and its potential clinical uses. In particular, given the results of supplemental analyses 
suggesting that judgments of intentionality differ most among paradigmatically-accidental items, 
the IBT could be strengthened by expanding the range of items to include more of these kinds of 
items. Further, future research should examine whether such cognitive biases precede and predict 
the emergence or worsening of symptoms. Previous research suggests that social cognitive bias 
tasks predict worsening of symptoms after a brief follow-up period (Buck et al., 2016b). It 
cannot be known based on the present study if or how a bias toward intentionality might play in 
the emergence of disorder related processes; if prospective studies provide support for this, the 
intentionality bias might provide another cognitive bias involved in the etiology of 
schizophrenia. Moreover, if these studies provide support for such a model, clinicians could 
practice encouraging individuals with psychosis to question initial impressions of others’ 
intentions, as has been indicated in previous cognitive-behavioral treatment approaches (e.g. 
SCIT; Roberts, Penn & Combs, 2015). 
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 With regard to the immorality bias task, the questions are more fundamental. 
Modifications should be made to the task and tested before continued use (including pilot testing 
at various millisecond increments), and improved editions should be tested on larger samples. On 
the other hand, future research could take the lessons of these null results and instead examine 
other biases that might better approximate the kinds of cognition relevant to psychosis. Some 
improvements might include changing vignettes to second person (Combs et al., 2007), including 
more items related describing non-threatening situations (Buck et al., 2017), as well as increasing 
emphasis on threat rather than abstract judgments. 
 Overall, the disparate, complex, yet promising results from the present study suggest that 
future research in the area of social cognitive biases in schizophrenia should be focused on a 
diverse array of biases, methodologies, and models of their emergence. As has been the case with 
previous social cognitive biases in psychosis (e.g. trustworthiness bias, hostile attribution bias), 
each construct appears to have its own complex profile and relationship to outcomes in this 
population. The present study makes a first-pass effort at applying a number of new methods to 
the study of social cognitive biases in schizophrenia, and as with any new application, such an 
endeavor provides significant promise as well as a number of limitations to address and 
questions to answer.  
  
60 
APPENDIX 1: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Comparing responses (in logistic regression) in the schizophrenia and control groups 
graphed as a function of inherent likelihood of responding for the Intentionality Bias Task (IBT) 
combined across time condition.  
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Figure 2. Comparing responses (in logistic regression) in the fast and slow conditions, graphed as 
a function of inherent likelihood of responding for the immorality bias (CIST) combined across 
groups.  
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APPENDIX 2: TABLES 
 
Table 1. An overview of the main aims, hypotheses, and related statistical tests in the proposed 
study.  
 
Aim Hypothesis Test Outcome Predictor Prediction 
#1. Group 
differences. 
Individuals with 
schizophrenia will make 
more attributions of 
intentionality and evil on 
both measures. 
Multi-level 
model  
Intentionality 
responses 
Immorality 
responses 
Group SCZ > CTRL 
 
#2. 
Automatic 
and 
controlled 
processes. 
Individuals with 
schizophrenia will 
demonstrate elevated 
biases, as well as deficits 
in the ability to make 
controlled judgments 
across low and high time 
pressure conditions. 
Multi-level 
model  
Intentionality 
responses 
Immorality 
responses 
Time pressure 
 
Group x Time 
Interaction 
Fast > Slow 
Interaction (! 
differences 
between 
groups in slow 
condition)  
Mixed-
model 
ANOVA. 
Automatic 
estimates 
(PDP) 
Group SCZ > CTRL 
Controlled 
estimates 
(PDP) 
Group 
Time pressure 
Group x Time 
Interaction 
CTRL > SCZ 
Slow > Fast 
Interaction (! 
differences 
between 
groups in slow 
condition) 
#3. 
Psychometric 
validation 
The immorality and 
intentionality biases will 
demonstrate sufficient 
psychometric 
characteristic as measures 
of hostile attributions in 
schizophrenia with regard 
to:  
Multi-level 
model  
Intentionality 
responses 
Immorality 
responses 
Group SCZ > CTRL 
 
Convergent validity Pearson 
correlations 
Total score 
Pure bias 
estimate 
Automatic 
estimate 
(PDP) 
Hostility 
symptoms 
Positive 
symptoms 
Susp./Pers. 
symptoms 
All positive 
(with the 
exception of 
Social 
Acceptability, 
negative)  
 
 Criterion validity Social 
acceptability 
Trait hostility 
Trait paranoia 
Observed 
hostility 
Discriminant Neurocognition Non-
significant 
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Table 2. An overview of the exploratory aims, hypotheses, and related statistical tests in the 
proposed study.  
 
Aim Test Outcome Predictor 
#1. Incremental 
validity of biases 
above social 
cognitive skill. 
Examine whether these new 
measures add variance in 
predicting criterion outcomes 
above and beyond existing 
measures of social cognitive skill. 
Hierarchical 
linear 
regression 
Pure bias 
(collapsed 
across time 
condition)  
After Step 1 of 
all SCOPE 
social cognitive 
skill measures 
(Those 
significant in 
aim #3) 
Social 
acceptability 
Trait hostility 
Trait paranoia 
Aggressive 
behavior 
Observed 
hostility 
#2. Control and 
neurocognition. 
Examine relationship of 
discernibility and control estimate 
to neurocognition.  
Pearson 
correlation  
Discernibility 
Control 
estimate (PDP) 
Neurocognition 
#3. Bias measures 
and functioning. 
Examine relationship of 
immorality and intentionality 
biases to measures of functioning. 
Pearson 
correlation  
Total score 
Pure bias 
Automatic 
estimate (PDP) 
Role functioning 
(total and 
subscales) 
 
Social skills 
#4. Bias measures 
and general distress. 
Examine relationship of 
immorality and intentionality 
biases to general non-psychosis 
related psychopathology 
symptoms. 
Pearson 
correlation  
Total score 
Pure bias 
Automatic 
estimate (PDP) 
Cognitive 
symptoms 
Emotional 
discomfort 
symptoms 
Negative 
symptoms 
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Table 3. Participant demographics and tests for differences between the schizophrenia and non-
clinical control samples.   
Group              
   SCZ full  Control full SCZ subset Control subset 
   (IBT only) (IBT only) (IBT/CIST) (IBT/CIST) 
   (n = 217)  (n =154)   (n = 42)  (n = 58)  Effect 
_____________________________________________________________________________________   
Demographics 
Age   41.71 (11.67) 41.95 (12.42) 39.82 (12.04) 41.07 (12.96)  
Education (years)  13.04 (2.49) 14.19 (1.91) 14.38 (2.25) 15.15 (1.66) **+++ 
Gender         
 Male  141 (64.98%) 97 (62.99%) 30 (71.43%) 39 (67.24%) 
 Female  76 (35.02%) 57 (37.01%) 12 (28.58%) 19 (32.76%) 
Race           & 
 White  115 (53.00%) 80 (51.95%) 33 (78.57%) 32 (55.17%) 
 Black  87 (40.10%) 62 (40.26%) 7 (16.67%) 23 (39.66%) 
 Am Ind / PI 3 (1.39%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (2.38%) 0 (0.00%) 
 Asian  5 (2.30%) 4 (2.60%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (1.72%) 
 Other  7 (3.22%) 8 (5.19%) 1 (2.38%) 2 (3.44%) 
 
Symptoms 
PANSS Cognitive   2.06 (0.69) --  2.09 (0.58) -- 
PANSS Hostility  1.43 (0.61) --  1.43 (0.48) -- 
 PANSS Susp. 2.80 (1.42) --  2.40 (1.23) --  + 
PANSS Emotional Distress 2.66 (1.12) --  2.60 (0.99) -- 
PANSS Negative  1.74 (0.75) --  1.92 (0.75) --  & 
PANSS Positive  2.52 (0.91) --  2.38 (0.80) -- 
 
Criterion outcomes 
OSCARS Hostility Item 2.77 (1.76) --  2.09 (1.10) --  ++ 
PADS Persecution (avg) 1.52 (1.07) 0.60 (0.68) 1.33 (0.99) 0.68 (0.72) *** 
PID-5 Hostility Scale 9.60 (6.99) 5.92 (4.87) 7.69 (5.42) 6.64 (5.55) ***^ 
SLOF Social Acceptability 4.43 (0.58) --  4.71 (0.30) --  ++ 
 
General functional outcomes 
SLOF Total  4.12 (0.64) --  4.37 (0.52) --  ++ 
 SLOF Work 3.72 (0.98) --  4.18 (0.79) --  ++ 
 SLOF Activities 4.54 (0.93) --  4.69 (0.69) --   
SSPA Total  4.14 (0.54) 4.54 (0.38) 4.51 (0.40) 4.36 (0.44) ***++ 
UPSA-B Total  70.80 (14.04) --  77.65 (11.41) --  +++ 
 
Neurocognition estimate 
WRAT   94.87 (14.62) 101.11 (11.48) 102.69 (11.48) 102.29 (10.12) *+++^ 
 
*Main effect of SCZ vs. Control across the full sample (*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p<.001)  
+Main effect of subset vs. full across clinical or control group (+p < .05, ++p < .01, +++p<.001)  
^Interaction of subset/full by group (^p < .05, ^^p < .01, ^^^p<.001) 
& The differences in racial breakdown between the groups approached significance in the CIST-only subset, χ2 = 8.54, sig. = .074. Additionally, 
the difference between the subsets was significant with regard to suspiciousness F(1, 215) = 4.103, p = .04, and approached significance with 
regard to negative symptoms, F(1, 215) = 3.05, p < .08. 
Note: A subset of participants completed both the IBT and CIST. These participants’ demographics and means for study variables are reported 
here in the “(full)” columns. The demographic and study variable means for the subset are reported for each group above in the “(CIST)” 
columns. PANSS, PADS, SLOF and SSPA scores are reported as item averages. 
 
  
65 
Table 4. Psychometric examination of the intentionality and immorality bias tasks (Hypothesis 
#3). All analyses are Pearson correlations.  
  
 Intentionality Bias (IBT) Immorality Bias (CIST)   
 Total Pure PDP Total Pure PDP 
 Score Bias Automatic Score Bias Automatic  
  
 
Hypothesis #3 – Psychometric validation  
 
Convergent validity – Hostility, positive, and suspiciousness symptoms 
 
PANSS Hostility .02 .11 .03 -.12 -.18 -.09 
PANSS Positive -.05 -.05 -.09 .14 .02 .12 
PANSS Suspiciousness .03 .04 .00 .05 -.24 .04 
 
Criterion validity – Social functioning 
 
SLOF – Social Accept. -.21* -.16^ -.13 -.17 -.03 -.19 
PID5 – Hostility Scale  .15* .15* .09 .24 -.16 .18 
PADS – Paranoia .13* -.04 .06 .08 .03 .07 
OSCARS – Hostility .17* .09 .12 -.11 -.09 -.20 
 
Discriminant validity – Intellectual functioning 
 
WRAT -.06 -.38*** -.10 -.03 -.06 -.05 
 
Note: Total participant totals for outcome measures differed from study totals, including the SLOF (n = 135) and OSCARS (n = 133) given 
response rates of informants.  
Total scores of the intentionality and immorality bias tasks are uncorrelated, r = -.04, p = .79. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10 
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Table 5. Additional psychometric examination of the intentionality and immorality bias tasks 
(Exploratory Aims #2 through #4).   
 
  
 Intentionality Bias (IBT) Immorality Bias (CIST)   
 Discernibility PDP  Discernibility PDF  
 Score Control  Score Control   
  
 
Exploratory Aim #2 – Intellectual functioning and control  
 
WRAT (CTRL) .19* .30***  .05 .32* 
WRAT (SCZ) .02 .36***  .14 .25 
 
 
 Intentionality Bias (IBT) Immorality Bias (CIST)   
 Total Pure PDP Total Pure PDP 
 Score Bias Automatic Score Bias Automatic  
  
 
Exploratory Aim #3 – General functioning  
 
SLOF – Total  -.17* -.14 -.16* -.17 -.22 -.09 
SLOF – Work performance -.11 -.14 -.07 -.14 -.09 -.05 
SLOF – Activities -.11 -.08 -.17^ -.06 -.20 -.07 
SSPA Total -.05 -.20** -.10 .08 .27^ .10 
UPSA Total -.15* -.25*** -.18* -.03 -.25 .03 
 
Exploratory Aim #4 – Negative and general symptoms  
 
PANSS Cognitive  -.06 .06 .00 -.17 -.16 -.13 
PANSS Emotional Distress  .20** .08 .09 .08 .08 .11 
PANSS Negative  -.07 -.08 -.09 -.01 -.17 .02 
 
Note: Total participant totals for outcome measures differed from study totals, including the SLOF (n = 135) and OSCARS (n = 133) given 
response rates of informants. Additionally, six participants did not complete the SSPA (n = 210), and eight did not complete the UPSA (n = 208). 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10 
 
 
67 
Table 6. Increm
ental validity analyses exam
ining partial relationships of sym
ptom
s and functional outcom
e w
ith (1) self-report item
s 
in accidental scenarios controlling for am
biguous scenarios, and (2) rater-scored item
s controlling for self-report item
 totals (all in the 
schizophrenia sam
ple only). 
   
Interpersonal 
T
rait 
T
rait  
H
ostile 
 
C
onflict 
H
ostility 
Paranoia 
B
ehavior 
 
 
 
 
SL
O
F 
PID
5 
PA
D
S 
O
SC
A
R
S 
 
Social A
cceptability 
H
ostility Scale 
T
otal 
H
ostility Item
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B
 
SE 
β 
B
 
SE 
β 
B
 
SE 
β 
B
 
SE 
β 
 
 
  Step 1 – SC
O
PE
 Social C
ognition Skills 
BLERT
 
0.04 
0.02 
0.22^ 
-.0.20 
0.19 
-0.11^ 
-0.07 
0.03 
-0.27* 
-.17 
0.06 
-0.34* 
ER-40 
-0.02 
0.02 
-0.13 
0.05 
0.15 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
0.12 
0.03 
0.05 
0.06 
Eyes Test 
0.01 
0.01 
0.10 
-0.06 
0.12 
-0.05 
0.02 
0.02 
0.10 
0.03 
0.04 
0.10 
H
inting Test 
0.01 
0.02 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.14 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
0.10 
-0.05 
0.05 
-0.09 
TASIT Total 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.15 
0.02 
0.08 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.06 
0.04 
0.03 
0.14 
 
(R
2 = .05, p = .27) 
(R
2 = .02, p = .68) 
(R
2 = .04, p = .13) 
(R
2 = .07, p = .12) 
 
Step 2 – IB
T
 T
otal 
 
 
B
LER
T
 
0.03 
0.02 
0.20 
-0.22 
0.18 
-0.13 
-0.07 
0.03 
-0.28** 
-0.16 
0.06 
-0.32* 
ER
-40 
-.0.02 
0.02 
-0.14 
0.10 
0.15 
0.06 
0.03 
0.02 
0.15 
0.03 
0.05 
0.07 
Eyes Test 
0.01 
0.01 
0.10 
-0.04 
0.12 
-0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.11 
0.03 
0.04 
0.10 
H
inting Test 
0.01 
0.02 
0.04 
-0.01 
0.14 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
0.10 
-0.04 
0.05 
-0.08 
TA
SIT Total 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.10 
-0.00 
0.08 
-0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.10 
Intentionality Bias Total  
-0.03 
0.01 
-0.19* 
0.26 
0.12 
0.15* 
0.04 
0.02 
0.15* 
0.07 
0.04 
0.14 
 
(ΔR
2 = .03, p = .03)* 
(ΔR
2 = .02, p = .03)* 
(ΔR
2 = .02, p = .03)* 
(ΔR
2 = .02, p =.11) 
Full M
odel R
2 
(R
2 = .08, p = .09)^ 
(R
2 = .04, p = .26) 
(R
2 = .06, p = .04)* 
(R
2 = .09, p = .08)^ 
 
 
N
ote: Sam
ple sizes for these analyses are consistent (n = 217), w
ith som
e exception, including the SLO
F (n = 135) and O
SC
A
R
S (n = 133) given response rates of inform
ants. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10 
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